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Abstract 
  
Over the course of the last fifteen years, Brazil has emerged as a global player of importance 
on both the political and the economic field. The research paper aims to understand Brazil’s 
current economic and political condition through the theoretical framework of Latin American 
Structuralism and Global Political Economy. 
 
First, the research paper seeks to investigate which historical and structural developments 
have fostered the rise of Brazil, including an analysis of the country’s history with emphasis 
on Brazil’s dependency on other countries and the period of industrialization. This is followed 
an analysis of modern Brazil with attention on historic developments during the totalitarian 
regime as well as the establishment of Plano Real. 
 
The second part of the research paper seeks to give an in depth analysis of the presidential 
terms of “The New Brazil”, Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff including an investigation of Brazil’s 
international relations, followed up with an analysis and discussion of the country’s current 
structural challenges. It is here looked into if these challenges can threaten the newfound 
strength and stability by analyzing aspects of Brazil’s current challenges such as the newly 
increased consumer class, infrastructure, the manufacturing industry, and tariff barriers. 
 
In the light of these challenges, the third and final part of the research paper aims to discuss 
the prospects for maintaining and improving Brazil’s position as an emerging global political 
and economic power. This has been executed by exploring Brazil’s changing trading patterns 
and discussing the inherent challenges of Brazil’s manufacturing industry.  
 
Through this three-part analysis, this research paper concludes that both internal and 
external forces have led to recent developments and rise of “The New Brazil”. Through the 
three above-mentioned presidents, further macroeconomic and social stability as well as a 
new social model has been achieved. Still, Brazil faces many challenges in creating a more 
competitive society and manufacturing industry aimed towards obtaining a bigger market 
share of the global market. This requires an enlargement of both welfare programs and state 
investments as well a continuation of the country’s regional focus in order to secure Brazil’s 
new position as an emerging global political and economic power. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Area 
A decade ago, the global financial elite feared to lose the B in the BRICs. The reason for 
these worries was that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva who was famous for leading strikes against 
military authoritarianism was about to become president of Brazil. Eight years later, after 
Lula’s second term, the position of Brazil among emerging economies was unquestioned. Its 
market and trade experienced a remarkable growth period, which was only temporarily halted 
by the global financial crisis in 2009. Millions of Brazilians moved from poverty to the middle 
class, creating the backbone of the growing Brazilian economy. Furthermore, the country 
discovered massive offshore oil reserves and its rich resource pool created increasing export 
surpluses. For the first time, Brazil seemed to be able to use its vast economic and natural 
resources to promote itself as a potentially big player in world politics. Moreover, Brazil 
became a leading promoter of an alternative international agenda pushing forward the 
interests of developing countries. Therefore, many believed that the Lula era overcame the 
tragedy of a popular Brazilian saying: “Brazil is the country of the future - and will always be”. 
 
However recently, Brazil’s prospects became shallow again. After three years of a sluggish 
world economy, growth in Brazil is as well close to stagnation. Brazilian politicians repeatedly 
emphasize Brazil’s determination to protect its economic gains, be it against Mexican or 
Chinese car manufacturing or against upwards pressures on the Brazilian currency by US 
deflationary programs. 
 
While especially Brazil’s administration coins portentous terms such as a looming currency or 
trade war, academia discusses controversially the challenges of the new Brazil. Ruchir 
Sharma, an analyst and researcher from Morgan Stanley, argues in the Journal on Foreign 
Relations that “Brazil’s consumer boom has been driven by income from commodity sales” to 
China (2012:87). Since, he expects Chinese growth and resource demand to drop during the 
next years, he concludes that Brazilian dependence on these exports would put an end to 
Brazil’s boom. His debatable claim caused several responses, which concluded that his 
analysis ignores the central role of political and economic stability for the consumer boom. 
Moreover, it does not account for progress made in addressing domestic challenges over the 
last decade, these factors are seen as stabilizers for the Brazilian economy that would make 
it less vulnerable than Sharma suggests (O’Neil & Lapper 2012). 
 
Looking into the debate, the observer wonders how Brazil arrived at its current position and 
what shaped the Brazil of the 21st century? Furthermore, Brazil is infamous for a set of 
challenges, that makes production in Brazil relatively expensive and is routinely criticized by 
Western observers as results of the prioritization on welfare spending, which puts Brazil into 
an inferior position among emerging markets (Sharma 2012). Particularly, lack of skilled labor, 
underdeveloped infrastructure and high labor costs are blamed to harm Brazilian 
competitiveness. Thus, this paper asks to which extend these obstacles challenge Brazil’s 
growth perspectives and in how far these challenges are structural problems of the Brazilian 
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state. 
 
Since trade became of increasing importance for Brazil’s economy, it needs to be analyzed 
how the low competitiveness level affects Brazilian trade. Further, it needs to be addressed 
whether its resource boom harms its manufacturing industry and might trap Brazil in a 
dependency relationship with countries such as China, which mainly import resources from 
Brazil? When accounting for Brazil’s huge resource pool, it is interesting whether it can 
contribute to the country’s prospects in the long run and whether Brazil needs to overcome 
high shares of resource exports in order to reach higher levels of development. 
 
1.1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Since, latest reports and articles present an equally mixed picture as the debate, stressing 
dramatic challenges as well as long term prospects, the discussion is in need of a long term 
oriented analysis that takes into account structural as well as historical developments and 
changes. In order to do so this project states the following problem statement: 
 
During the last decade, Brazil gained recognition as an emerging global political and 
economic power. Which historical and structural developments have fostered this 
emergence? What current structural challenges does the country face that could 
threaten newfound strength and stability? Considering these challenges, what are the 
prospects and obstacles for maintaining and improving Brazil’s new position? 
 !  
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Project Focus and Choice of Theory 
 
Global Political Economy (GPE) has been chosen as one of the theoretical pillars for this 
paper for several reasons. First of all, GPE serves as a fundament for the field of 
investigation by both enabling and limiting our research within the interrelation between state 
and market.  Furthermore, GPE enables a less normative and more contemporary analysis of 
Brazil’s domestic and global market relations than what a project solely based on Latin 
American Structuralism would do. GPE accentuates more recent and explanatory factors to 
analyze and discuss. Moreover, GPE has through its relatively soft theoretical boundaries 
enabled the use of historical factors in the analysis and understanding of contemporary 
political economic research. 
 
Our choice of Latin American structuralism as the other theoretical pillar for this paper, was 
selected as it provides a Latin American view on the countries’ development in the Latin 
American region. First of all, Latin American structuralism is a development theory, which 
provides a development strategy through its recommendation of ISI policies. In this sense it is 
not a Western- or Eurocentric theory, which has been important for the choice of this theory. 
It has its roots in Argentina, represented by Raúl Prebisch (1901-1986), previous chairman of 
the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Prebisch was the 
main founder of Latin American structuralism. Moreover, Prebisch introduced  ‘center-
periphery system’, which illustrates the structural approach towards trade. The Prebisch-
Singer thesis is introduced as it provides perspectives on the economic development 
between center and periphery countries. In addition the development strategy of ISI has 
greatly influenced government policies in many Latin American countries throughout history 
as well as it does today. 
 
2.2 Empirical Data and Secondary data 
In terms of qualitative methods, this paper builds extensively on secondary empirical data. 
Essential statistical sources for this project have been the Central Bank of Brazil, the United 
Nations (ECLAC), and the World Bank. In order to establish a historical analysis the 
concerning chapters are mainly based on the book New Brazil by Riordan Roett. 
Furthermore, the paper draws on an interview with Vinicius Mariano De Carvalho (2012), 
professor for Brazilian Studies at Aarhus University, which was conducted to explore the 
complexity of challenges when discussing Brazil’s emergence. 
 
When analyzing a countries policy approach it is very likely that authors interpret policy 
choices according to their political affiliations. This project therefore, treats its sources 
carefully in order to not rely on incoherent data. However, the instance that we are not able to 
draw on Portuguese sources leads to an overweight of sources that share mainstream liberal 
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economic affiliations and therefore can contradict with the structuralist theoretical framework 
of this paper.  
 
2.3 Statistical Data 
It has been essential for this project to use statistical data, in order to analyze the economic 
development in Brazil. Though, when using official statistics a number of points must be 
discussed to secure the valid fundament for this project. Tim May (2011) introduces three 
different schools of thoughts within official statistics: the realists, institutionalists and radical 
school of thought. Where the institutionalist and radical focus on the production of the 
statistics as well the political and institutional influence on the data, the realist is 
characterized as understanding statistics to be “objective indicators of the phenomena to 
which they refer” (May, 2011). This project will use the realist school approach, as it is 
preconditioned for the analysis on Brazil’s trade and domestically economic situation, that the 
statistic provided is trustworthy. Even though, when collecting statistical data the reliability of 
the data must be questioned. Official statistics can differ in the methodology of collecting data 
and the definition of social indicators and change over time (Neumann, 2011: 378). 
 
In this project a number of different official sources have been used to cover the economic 
development of Brazil, which need to be addressed, The World Bank, Central Bank of Brazil 
and the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE), as the most important. 
Especially, data from the Central Bank of Brazil has been used to create graphs and figures. 
Therefore, we collected recurring indicators from annual reports between 1997 to the latest 
report of 2010 in order to demonstrate shifts of indicators over time. Though it is a limitation 
that we cannot provide more recent data, since these indicators were not available from the 
same institution. 
 
2.4 Limitations 
 
When exploring Brazil’s economic and political challenges, it is only natural that some limits 
must be applied in order to grasp the subject. As the paper concentrates on trade and 
competitiveness it has been decided to exclude some historical, social and cultural aspects, 
such as health, demography or unemployment as it would not have impacted the result of the 
analysis fundamentally.  
 
This paper applies an overall state-market analysis in which the state is the central unit of 
analysis. In this respect, the influence of international institutions, such as WTO and IMF has 
not been analyzed. Moreover, regional organizations such as Mercosur and UNASUR are 
regarded as state-agents rather than actors.   
 
Foreign Direct Investments and the financial sector have to a certain extent been left out of 
the analysis. While both of these factors are considered important for the overall 
6 
understanding of Brazil’s relation with the global market, this paper mainly focuses on trade 
relations. FDI flows and the financial sector has therefore only been prioritized as aspects of 
certain cases and have not been analyzed in-depth. 
 !  
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3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 Global Political Economy 
The theoretical structure of Global Political Economy (GPE) presented by Ronen Palan et.al. 
(2000) is chosen as the foundation for the analysis of Brazil as a national and global actor. 
GPE descents from the recognized international relations theory International Political 
Economy (IPE), but differentiate in a manner of ways, which will be elaborated below. 
In order to understand GPE’s field of investigation, it is first important to understand the 
elements that GPE consists of. As the name clearly suggests, GPE distinguishes itself from 
an ordinary political science or economic analysis. In so far that GPE as a theoretical 
approach rejects the idea that neither an analysis of political science nor economy, it is able 
to grasp the complexity of states, social groups, markets or globalization (ibid.: 4). Since 
political science mainly focus on self interest and power within structure, it is therefore unable 
to directly interpret the influence of economic factors such as tariffs, trade and labor situations 
in the same way as economic theory is able interpret it and vice versa. 
But GPE does not only concern how political science and economic theories support each 
other in an analysis; the theoretical framework brings forth an autonomous epistemological 
understanding of the global reality. First of all, GPE dissociates itself from the behavioralist 
rational actor understanding of mainstream economics. Instead GPE encourages the social 
scientist to understand the social reality through groups, classes, structures or nations and 
not individual actions (ibid.: 9). That is to say the political aspects dominate economic 
decisions and economic aspects dominate political decisions – the border between these two 
sciences is only constructed for our interpretation and does not hold sway with global reality. 
As argued by Gilpin in 1987: 
 
In the Absence of state, the price mechanism, and market forces would determine the 
outcome of economic activities; this would be the pure world of economist. In the absence of 
market, the state and its equivalent would allocate economic resources; this would be the 
pure world of political scientist… The parallel existence and mutual interaction of ´state´ and 
´market´ in the modern world create ´political economy´. (ibid.: 3) 
 
Second, GPE argues that material or economic interests are not the center of every event 
seen nationally or globally (ibid.: 7). Instead, power, history, or the value of ideas might have 
been influencing on the outcome of decisions. Therefore, it can be argued that the use of 
GPE amplifies a political-economic analysis of the field of investigation within this report and 
enables an analysis of Brazil’s situation on two separate levels; (1) An analysis of the state’s 
domestic involvement in Brazil with its own set of rules– an analysis that is also practiced in 
conventional and new political economy, and (2) an analysis of Brazil’s international 
involvement and influence, a system which also follows its own independent set of rules (ibid: 
10). 
One of the main ontological assumptions of GPE is therefore that state behavior is complex 
and social scientists needs to carry out an analysis on both levels in order to understand the 
reality of the nation. This is also where IPE and GPE detach from each other. While IPE 
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today mainly is seen as an international relations theory with branches in mainly Realism, 
Pluralism and Marxism, GPE has returned to the original thoughts of Political Economy, 
however with a global aspect and less barriers for analysis. This means that in contrary to 
IPE, which mainly investigates (economic) state affairs between nations, GPE investigates 
both the national and global level. Thereby, it does not restrict itself to use conventional state 
logic of international relations theory, but opens up for understanding political and economic 
state behavior through sociology, history, geography and philosophy (ibid.: 10). 
GPE therefore leaves open the possibility to adapt a bricolagetechnique on the domestic and 
global level, since the field of investigation is so vast that the barriers between ontological 
understandings need to be broken down in order to grasp different aspects of global 
developments. The main importance here is to approach the subject from the epistemological 
assumption that the barrier between politics and economics should be dissolved and answers 
should be found across the board. 
 
3.2 States and Markets 
In order to understand the use of GPE in the analysis of Brazil, it is important to obtain an 
insight in how far the state and market influence each other, since the field of analysis to a 
certain extent will be understood through a correlation of these entities. Understanding state 
and market differs greatly depending on ontological and philosophical assumptions. While 
these entities generally are left to political scientists and economists, they still have relevance 
for GPE, which investigates the interrelation between state and market. First, it is important to 
ratify the interdependence of states and markets in modern society (Schwartz 2010: 1). In 
other words, states cannot exist without their markets, and markets cannot exist without the 
states. 
Simultaneously, states are in general recognized to have the upper hand on sovereign 
ground, and thereby have the right to alter or intervene in the market at the domestic level 
through taxes, tariffs, monetary policy etc. (Palan et. al. 2000: 8-10). The state has the right 
to administer domestic resources, create monopolies, exclude or expel foreign companies or 
even nationalize private companies due to the state’s sovereignty and monopoly on violence 
within state borders. Despite the state’s superiority over the market, the state is deeply 
dependent on markets for several reasons. First of all, the markets are by far the biggest 
source of income for the state. Second of all, states would not be able to deliver safety nor to 
successfully execute power without any form of stable market. States and governments stand 
and fall on market conditions. 
It is important to stress the fact that markets today do not (only) exist on the domestic level, 
but to a large extent exist on a global level. Consequently, to enter the markets today means 
to enter the global market (Schwartz: 2010, 3). Through the global market comes 
competitiveness, since globalization naturally forces interaction with markets in other states. 
Due to strict market conditions, states are forced to regulate taxes and tariffs in order to 
maintain competitive domestic production and markets. It is therefore argued that states 
today strive to obtain a high level of competitiveness rather than having an autonomous self-
sufficient national economy (Palan et. al. 2000: 27). 
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3.2.1 Competition State 
Economic globalization requires states to respond towards new arrangements of international 
trade, interlinked markets and international capital flows. According to Philip G. Cerny (2006: 
377) states mostly responds with an opening of the economy to globalization since “the 
promotion of competitiveness and of competition in general has become a political priority”. 
This approach is not dependent on a classical liberal system but can be followed by any state 
system. Its key characteristic is however, that the state exposes its markets to forces of 
globalization in order to make them more competitive. 
 
3.3 Latin American Structuralism 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of Latin American Structuralism, a theory 
closely related to the well-established dependency theory. Latin American Structuralism had 
a significant influence on economic development throughout the modern Latin American 
history until today. Latin American Structuralism will be presented through the ideas of Raúl 
Prebisch and Hans Singer, the key contributors of the theory. Their long established 
theoretical assumptions did not lose their explanatory power until today and offer a 
framework that accounts for the complex relation of states and markets as well as highlight 
the special position of developing countries in the global economy. 
 
3.3.1 The Latin American Structuralists 
In 1948 the United Nation agreed to form the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC).  The ECLAC was destined to become the center of new thoughts 
and perspectives of the Third World countries and it also provided a forum for early Latin 
American structuralists. The structuralists argued that less-developed countries of the 
periphery were structurally and institutionally different from the developed nations of the 
center, hence some aspects of both the orthodox economic theory and developmentalist 
theory were inapplicable. The Latin American structuralists questioned Ricardian theory of 
comparative advantage and the benefits of free trade among nations. Raúl Prebisch, one of 
several early prominent Latin American structuralists, challenged these thoughts of economic 
development by initiating an academic debate on development (Cypher & Dietz 2008: 169). 
 
3.3.2 Prebisch – Center-periphery system 
As an Argentine economist, Raúl Prebisch mainly concentrated on the economic structures in 
Latin America. He separated the purely theoretical aspects of economics from the actual 
practice of trade and the power structures, which are the fundament for trading institutions 
and agreements. Prebisch made a distinction between the center countries consisting of 
industrialized nations such as the United States, and the peripheral countries consisting of 
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developing countries, mostly suppliers of commodities. He argued that the international trade 
between center and peripheral countries kept the developing countries in their poor economic 
situation. According to Prebisch, developed countries can be found in the center of the 
economic system, while the underdeveloped countries are in the periphery (Meier et al. 1985: 
176-184).   
First, Prebisch gives it a cyclical character, saying that the ‘center-periphery’ system is 
reflected by the active role of the industrial centers and the passivity of the periphery, where 
the consequences are intensified economic fluctuation of the center. The industrialized 
countries are favored by this position. By their early technical progress, the industrialized 
countries organize the system to serve their own interests, leaving the peripheral countries 
with few options, as they are dependent on their natural resources for production and exports. 
This leads to an unequal relation in trade, since the peripheral countries who produces and 
export the materials, does not have the advantages from the technology development (ibid.: 
176). From a structuralist point of view, the Latin American countries are therefore unlikely to 
keep up with the stages of economic growth of the more advanced capitalist countries. 
 
3.3.3 Prebisch-Singer thesis 
The German economist Hans Singer had separately come to the same conclusion as 
Prebisch. In continuation of Prebisch’s center-periphery system, the Prebisch-Singer thesis 
argues that trade relations between developed and developing countries are unequal 
because of the economic system, productive and labor market structure (Cypher et al. 2008: 
175). 
 
Generally, the Prebisch-Signer thesis states that there are unequal levels in development. 
They argue that the more advance center countries gain from the international trade with the 
peripheral countries and that this is reinforcing a higher level of development in the center 
countries. The Prebisch-Singer thesis would therefore argue that free trade is not in the 
advantage of the peripheral countries. Both Prebisch and Singer are stating that there is an 
asymmetric development of the world’s exports prices. Looking into history, the peripheral 
countries have always had a high production of primary goods that are mainly exported to 
center countries, which then export manufacturing goods to the peripheral countries. The 
Prebisch-Singer thesis stress the problem that industrial goods produced and traded by 
developed countries have a higher income elasticity of demand than goods produced and 
traded by poor countries (Thirwall 2011: 271). This means that the global increase in wealth 
leads to increasing export revenues for the developed countries, because products with an 
income elasticity of demand of more than unity (luxury goods) are more demanded, and 
therefore their prices increase. 
 
Furthermore, Singer argues that the center countries are dominated by oligopolistic industries, 
which to some degree have control over the prices of their final products. Thereby they can 
decide the price for exporting goods to the developing countries and thereby they become 
“price makers”. The peripheral countries, which trades mostly with primary products will not 
have the same opportunity, as the prices on primary products are difficult to control by the 
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producers and they are to some extend ‘price takers’ instead of ‘price makers’ as the center 
countries (Cypher & Dietz 2008: 175). The peripheral countries would therefore have to 
produce more primary products to obtain the same quantity of imported manufacturing goods. 
In such a trade situation, the center countries would benefit to a much bigger extent than the 
periphery countries (ibid.). 
 
Moreover, the peripheral countries have a surplus of unskilled labor, which is also mentioned 
as a challenge, as it puts downward pressure on the wages. And as labor unions and social 
convention is not that strong compared with the center countries, the institutional mechanism 
for raising wages with increased productivity as a result of advances in technology is lacking. 
 
3.3.4 ISI-strategy 
Due to Prebisch’s influence in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), he 
became firmly associated with import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy. Prebisch and 
Singer saw ISI as a solution for developing countries to overcome the unequal trade pattern 
with the center countries. ISI is trade policy, in which a nation isolates itself from international 
trade through trade barriers and tariffs, and instead begins to manufacture simple products, 
which previously were imported, thereby replacing previously imported products with 
domestic goods. As the center countries formerly were the primary benefactors of the 
international trade, the peripheral countries can now industrialize to become more like the 
center countries in terms of its productive and export structures (Cypher & Dietz 2008: 173). 
Therefore, the peripheral countries must begin with producing the simple goods that were 
previously imported by the center countries. When the ISI strategy has been active for some 
time, the boost to simple manufactured goods will increase the demand for labor in cities, 
which will encourage workers from rural areas to move to these areas. The strength of ISI’s 
focus on simple manufactured goods is that these goods require a relatively low know-how in 
order to be produced. Since most of the rural labor force is generally poorly educated, they 
are still able to contribute and produce these goods. Over time it will thereby be possible to 
produce more advanced goods, due to that produced wealth now will stay within the country, 
which enables the government to invest in education and other social factors. By initiating the 
ISI strategy, the price of domestic industrial production will naturally be higher compared to 
imported industrial goods, but compared to the export income lost through trading with center 
countries is loss of income is irrelevant, according to Prebisch (Meier et al. 1985: 178). To 
prevent the prices from becoming too high on the domestic products, states are required to 
raise tariff barriers against imported manufactured goods. Prebisch argues, that in the short 
term the ISI is necessary for the industrialization of the peripheral countries. By implementing 
the ISI strategy Prebisch and Singer claims that the developing countries can overcome the 
unequal relation in trade between center and periphery countries and, this will in the long 
term make them more competitive in international trade (ibid. 179).  
 
3.3.5 Logistical state 
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As a replacement of the supposedly universal macro-theories, developed by the academic 
thinkers of the "centers" (mainly the United States), professor Amado Cervo, developed the 
"Brazilian" concept (or paradigm) of the "logistical state". This concept builds around foreign 
policy and state-market relations apparent in several Latin American countries, among them 
Brazil. This concept provides a framework for taking a state-market discussion on the global 
level. 
 
On the theoretical level, the concept of the logistical State permits the delinking of “Brazil 
from the development theories' vision of dependence on the "center" and "periphery". ” 
(Bernal-Meza 2010). In this view, Brazil is not periphery; it is in a middle or transitional 
position, able to aim at becoming a center country by mimicking the behavior of the center 
countries. 
 
The main thesis is that that the state's foreign policy serves as a launch pad for 
“internationalization of domestic companies” (ibid.). “By the aggregation of national 
enterprises to the international production chains and direct investment abroad, starting with 
neighboring countries” (ibid.), Brazil and countries alike are promoting coherent global 
strategies for both market and state. 
 
3.4 Critical Discussion of the Theories 
3.4.1 Global Political Economy 
In spite of GPE’s foundation in Political Economy, GPE is a relatively new addition to the 
theoretical field. Considering the theory’s acceptance of various economic and political 
theories as well as complex ontological and epistemological understandings, the theory’s 
framework can often become blurry and almost seem non-existent. While this can be 
problematic, it is important to stress that GPE primary has been used to establish the state-
market relation. Therefore this barrier can be overcome to a large extent by not following a 
single epistemological approach and instead uses different points from different schools of 
thought. 
 
3.4.2 Latin American Structuralism 
Latin American Structuralism was established in the 50s. It is important to draw attention to 
how this period was structurally different. Even though, this theory has developed throughout 
the years, Latin American Structuralism still bears resemblance to the original thoughts of the 
Prebisch-Singer thesis. This fact needs to be accounted for; inconsistencies have been 
addressed by introducing the more recent concept of the logistical state. Even though this is 
not part of Latin American Structuralism it builds upon the logic of center-periphery relations. 
 
To not simplify the trade relation between countries, when using the ‘center-periphery’ 
system,, it is acknowledged throughout this paper that countries can be both exploited and 
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exploit on the same time depending on international relations through introduction of 
concepts such as semi periphery.It has furthermore been taken into account that several 
mainstream economics has dismissed the ISI strategy entirely and accused it for doing more 
harm than good when applied on a country. The purpose for adding Latin American 
Structuralism to the theoretical framework is to enable a historical understanding of Brazil’s 
development strategy as well as to provide a framework, which would enable an analysis of 
Brazil’s current domestic and global challenges.  
 !  
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4. Analysis of Brazil’s historic development 
In understanding the political-economic challenges that Brazil holds today, one must 
understand the key historical developments of Brazil and the world surrounding it. The 
following chapter provides a brief account of these trends, focusing mainly on the modern era 
of the 1930s to 1994. 
4.1 The Economic Cycles of Colonial and Pre-modern Brazil, 1500-
1930 
A characteristic of Brazil's history is the occurrence of several long-lasting "economic cycles", 
in which a single or a few exported goods have been predominant. The first economic cycle 
(until about 1550) was created by the Brazil wood, which became the monopoly of the 
Portuguese king as well as giving name to the colony. The second economic cycle was sugar, 
together with tobacco and cotton. The sugar production became crucial for Brazil's economic 
and social structure, which was characterized by plantation work, slave labor, and 
monoculture. 
 
In the search for gold and indian slaves, the borders of modern Brazil would be defined. 
Settlers from especially São Paulo went on countless expeditions in the western parts, 
challenging the treaty borders and preparing for an enormous nation to emerge. In 1693 gold 
was found in such quantities that it quickly replaced the sugar as the most important export of 
Brazil, marking the shift towards the third economic cycle. In mid 1700s the annual export of 
gold was 15,000 tons, of which the Portuguese state got one-fifth through duties. 
 
In the following years and centuries to come the borders of Brazil was challenged by other 
colonizing nations as well as neighboring countries because of the tempting vast resources of 
the land, but they were successfully fought off by the Portuguese. Furthermore several 
separatist movements took up the fight for independence, but the armed forces of Rio de 
Janeiro successfully defeated them. In other words, the expansion of the colony’s borders 
combined with the control of its sovereignty by the armed forces, heavily consolidated Brazil’s 
potential to become a great power later in history. 
 
Growing opposition towards the Portuguese colonialists combined with war in Europe, led the 
Portuguese to open up the Brazilian trade monopoly for their ally, Great Britain. At this time 
Britain was in its 2nd phase of its industrial revolution, and so started a long-lasting trade 
relationship between Britain and Brazil, where Britain delivered industry goods mostly made 
from steel in exchange with Brazil's less valued primary goods such as coffee and sugar. 
This new opening introduced printing press, newspapers, banking, higher education, and 
court of law to Brazil. But, in nature the trade relationship was unequal, and Brazil remained 
"trapped" as a periphery resource-dependent nation for many years to come. 
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The political fight over Brazil as Portugal had regained strength and wanted its previous 
power back, ended in the independence of 1822, which marked a surprisingly peaceful 
beginning of a new era for Brazil. 
 
In the 1870s British support of building railroads helped the expansion of the coffee industry, 
which by 1894 had made Brazil, and especially the province of São Paulo, the world’s most 
important coffee export center, marking the fourth economic cycle. São Paulo and Minas 
Gerais became infamous as the café comleite provinces, because especially the coffee 
landowners gained political power and dominated the national economy and the political 
system until the period of modernization in 1930. 
 
Dependence on natural resources had been and would remain the country’s economic model 
well into the twentieth century (Roett 2010: 24). At the same time Britain was already in a 
preferred position of supplying manufactured goods to Brazil, which reduced local incentives 
to invest in industry. This economic model, which would later be known as the classical 
international division of labor, mainly served the interests of the elite and created severe 
economic and social problems for the periphery parts of Brazil. 
 
4.2 Industrialization, Modernization, and ISI, 1930-64 
In the 1920s and 30s most African and Asian countries were still being colonized. In contrary 
Brazil had been independent for almost a century, somewhat making possible the 
industrialization which it experienced in this period. Most of the Latin American countries had 
freed themselves from the colonizers, which was a big opportunity to lead an independent 
trade policy with the outside world. Still, Mexico and Argentina were the only other Latin 
American countries to industrialize in this period. The reason for this could be that Mexico, 
Argentina, and Brazil are big countries with big populations and diverse resource pools. This 
creates the potential for big domestic markets as well. These factors made them more 
predisposed to industrialization than their peer periphery-country neighbors, some of which 
were increasingly prone to political and military tyranny from the United States. 
 
With The Wall Street Crash of 1929 the Great Depression was unleashed and international 
trade collapsed, abolishing the classical trade relation between center and periphery 
countries and making room for certain countries to industrialize on their own. This is 
explained in the case of Latin America by former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso: 
 
“Production and markets had been reorganized in the wake of the 1929 depression, 
and some Latin American economies had accumulated large amounts of foreign 
exchange and had benefitted from the wartime protection of domestic markets selling 
staples and even industrialized products abroad, with no corresponding possibility of 
importing merchandise, because American and European economies were devoted to 
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the war effort. They seemed to be on the verge of closing the cycle known as ‘import 
substitution’.” (Cardoso &Faletto 1979:1-2) 
 
Here, Cardoso refer to the term import substitution industrialization (ISI), which gained 
political support all over Latin America throughout the 20th century as a strategy to become 
less dependent from industrialized countries. Importantly also, this quote describes a 
historical situation in which the pursuance of ISI was almost inevitable because of the large 
amounts of capital and the simultaneous decline of the West - the best possible conditions for 
a periphery country to develop away from dependency. Getúlio Vargas was the first president 
who had the opportunity of following the ISI policy, and thus he created the National Bank of 
Economic and Social Development, which invested in key sectors such as energy. 
Simultaneously the petroleum industry was nationalized under the new state owned 
enterprise Petrobrás. 
 
In spite of the relative newfound dependency, Europe and the US still played a predominant 
role in the trade relations of Brazil throughout the first half of the 20th century as seen in 
Graph 4.1. In the period from 1901 to 1958 Brazilian exports to the US and Europe never got 
below 70 percent of Brazil’s total exports. And when Europe was harmed by the two world 
wars, the US market just took over. 
Graph 4.1also shows the steady decline in exports to Europe and the steady growth of 
exports to the US. More meaningful than surpassing Europe as a trading partner was the 
political attention for the United States by Brazil. In order to confirm its independence from 
former colonial powers Brazil claimed as the first country to have a so-called ‘special 
relationship’ with the United States, in the beginning of the 20th century (Teixeira 2011). In 
the aftermath Brazil became the closest ally of the United States in Latin America, assisting 
them in diplomatic conflicts with other countries of the region as well as suppressing 
communist groups and parties during the Cold War period. A reaffirmation of this strong 
relationship was when Brazil, as the only Latin American country, sent troops to Europe 
during World War Two. 
 
Graph 4.1: Brazilian Exports to Europe and the United States (1901 - 1960) 
 
Source: Teixeira (2011) 
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The industrialization in the beginning of the 20th century resulted in the emergence of groups 
such as the urban workers and a new middle class. From 1930 the agrarian aristocracy lost 
its grip on power in national affairs, creating a window of opportunity in national politics for 
newcomers. In 1946 there were four parties; in 1964 this number had grown into thirteen. 
Many of these were small parties representing minor interest groups or lobbies, but they 
caused stalemate in national and state legislatures and created tension between the 
executive and the congress. 
This tumultuous period in the nation’s history included many political tendencies: 
Radicalization on both left and right wing, increasing importance of the Catholic Church in 
national politics, increasing CIA involvement in domestic affairs (due to the Cold War), state 
centralization, and an emerging totalitarian spirit subsequently leading to the 1964-85 military 
regimes. 
 
In the first half of the 50s industrialization gathered speed, and with president Kubitschek in 
power it accelerated. Pledging that Brazil would develop fifty years during his five-year term, 
Kubitschek actually supervised significant economic and social change as well as building the 
new capital Brasília in less than four years. Also, a deepening in the ISI policies had changed 
the export profile from coffee and agricultural products into industrial goods and more 
sophisticated raw materials, marking the move from periphery country towards a semi-
periphery one. This meant a more diverse export profile as well it marked the leave from 
centuries old trade patterns. Still, to this day Vargas and to a certain degree Kubitschek are 
honored ISI-politicians in Brazil. 
The annual growth rate in 1947-52 was more than 6 percent, and in the Kubitschek years it 
reached 7.8 percent. (Roett 2010: 48) And as Lincoln Gordon (quoted in ibid.) underlines: 
“That expansion was not merely quantitative; it moved from light industry into increasingly 
sophisticated consumer durable goods, intermediate goods, and a wide range of capital 
goods. With industrialization came more than a doubling of urbanization.” 
 
The economic success resulted in social changes: life expectancy rose, infant mortality 
declined, and literacy improved. But still, inflation pressured the Brazilians’ living standards – 
a cyclical problem that would torment the Brazilians well into the 1990s. 
The consequences of urbanization also began to show in a deepening of both regional and 
sectorial inequality. Separation rather than integration shaped social life, and the ongoing 
(and historical) neglect of education for others than the elite further created obstacles for 
social cohesion as well as industrial growth. 
In addition, the success of the implemented ISI policies was only relative. Though 
increasingly industrialized recent administrations had forgotten the need to promote and 
diversify exports, and the investments had required funds from outside, which meant that 
Brazil was heavily indebted by 1961. 
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4.3 Totalitarianism, "Industrialization by Invitation", and Debt Crisis, 
1964-84 
 
The economic and political confusion coupled with the fear of losing power within the military 
resulted in the 1964 coup d'état and the inauguration of a military regime. Astounding to the 
outsider, the military was backed up by several large groups such as business leaders, the 
middle class, and landowners, who had all felt neglected during many presidencies before 
them. 
 
In contrary to many other bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America, the military 
created its own two parties and maintained the political organs. The explanation for this is 
found as far back as the imperial period, where the emperor was given a ‘moderating power’, 
meaning that he would not engage in day-to-day administrative affairs, but on the other hand 
had the authority to “moderate” in times of tension or crisis. Historically the armed forces of 
Brazil has acted within the framework of this concept, resulting in several reasonably 
nonviolent regime changes. Nonetheless this was about to change during the military regime: 
As fear of torture and liquidation spread within the population, the opposition won big at the 
1965 election, forcing the military to increase its power position by dismantling the democratic 
institutions. 
 
Economically, the military regime represented a major break with the ISI tradition, since they 
introduced what could be dubbed "industrialization by invitation". In short, Brazil maintained 
its tariff barriers and simultaneously invited multinational companies to establish productions 
in the country. Enticed by low labor costs and no disapproving labor unions these companies 
could produce cheap products with no concern of the workers’ rights like strikes and 
minimum work conditions. This policy established several new industries, among them the 
big automotive industry, for which Brazil has been famous ever since. This foreign-led 
industrialization, expanding at an average annual rate of 12.6 percent after 1967, led to an 
economic miracle in the period between 1968 and 1973, resulting in a decline in public debt 
from 4.3 percent of GDP in 1963 to 0.3 percent in 1971, and inflation declined from close to 
90 percent in 1964 to about 20 percent for the rest of the decade. Agriculture declined, and 
industry and services grew equally. Brazil’s export profile diversified, and external trade grew 
at a higher rate than the economy as a whole. 
But, while business was thriving and the economy growing, the vast majority of the people 
were severely suppressed by low salaries, unemployment and bad work conditions. 
Inequality went up as could be seen directly in Brazils GINI-coefficient, which was one of 
lowest in the world during the dictatorship, only to have risen quite recently. 
This situation made some flee the country for better opportunities, which was the case for a 
young future president Cardoso. Most people would be forced in their position though, and 
among these were the young future president LuizInácio Lula da Silva, commonly known as 
Lula. He was a metals worker and union member in in the ABC region, which is widely known 
in Brazil and abroad because of the great number of international companies, particularly car 
manufacturers that have been installed in its area. Lula helped organizing major strikes and 
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for this he was put to jail for a month. Also a young future president Dilma Rousseff fought 
against the military dictatorship in various Marxist urban guerrilla groups, for which she was 
jailed between 1970 and 1972 and reportedly tortured. This era would shape future politicians 
and eventually require a regime change. 
 
In the seventies the world seemed more global and more insecure than ever before. As Brazil 
imported 80 percent of its petroleum (Roett 2010: 64), the 1973 oil crisis in the Middle East 
posed a serious challenge to the leaders of Brazil. At the time, the moderate president 
Ernesto Geisel and his economic advisor Golbery do Couto e Silva were keen on opening up 
the system, and thus were dependent on the support of the people. The only popularity the 
government enjoyed was because of the miracle growth, which was the reason why Geisel 
and Golbery decided upon keeping growth high by borrowing foreign capital to invest in the 
import substitution of basic industrial products such as steel, copper, petrochemicals, and 
more, as well as the more technological hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, and alcohol 
production. 
 
Several Latin American countries borrowed huge sums of money from international creditors 
such as the World Bank and commercial banks for industrialization in this period. But in the 
face of the 1973 oil crisis and the 1979 energy crisis, the American Federal Reserve raised 
its interest rate to attract capital in the early 1980s, with Europe following suit. Thus, world 
interest rates increased from 6.8 percent in 1977 to 18.8 percent in 1981 (Roett 2010: 77). 
This had a catastrophic effect on the developing world, since debt payments suddenly 
became increasingly expensive. Consequently the world trade contracted, which caused the 
prices of primary resources all over the world to fall, and by 1982 Brazil faced a liquidity crisis 
and went bankrupt. 
Consequently Brazil was forced to approach the IMF and adopt a generally neoliberal 
economic policy, which would last throughout the 1980s and 90s. The austerity program 
functioned from 1982-84, and it left a seriously troubled and socially unstable, though 
rebounding economy. Public sector debt rose from 3 percent of GDP in 1982 to 17.5 percent 
in 1989. Inflation was up 200 percent, which reduced the purchasing power of the middle 
class. And external debt was sky-high at US$104 billion – 52 percent of GDP. Under the 
Sarney administration (1985-90) the foreign debt had declined to US$95 billion, but still it 
would be the biggest in the world at the time. 
 
4.4 Transition and Hyperinflation, 1984-1994 
Though Geisel and Golbery seriously indebted Brazil, they simultaneously contained the 
hard-liner wing of the military and restored the ‘moderating power’ role of the military. 
Personal freedoms were reinstated, censorship reduced, torture restrained, and in 1979 the 
abandoned multiparty system was restored. Unions were allowed in 1978, and in 1979 strikes 
were held and led by the metalworkers union, headed by Lula. 
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Following were a number of elected presidents that marked a transition period from the 
authoritarian regime towards a new one. Yet the political landscape of the 1980s and well 
into the 90s was influenced by lack of newcomers, oligarchy and corruption, which made the 
transition towards a more deepened democracy significantly slower. 
 
In terms of Brazil’s trade with the US, the 1980s and 90s did not offer significant change, but 
when evaluating on the whole second part of the 20th century from 1960 until 2000, a steady 
and significant decline can be detected (see Graph 4.2). Looking at Brazil’s trade with it’s 
most important trading partner between suggests a loss of interest into the ‘special 
relationship’, since it declined considerably from around 40 percent in the early 1960’s to 
approximately 25 percent in 2001. 
 
Graph 4.2: Brazilian Trade with the United States (1960 - 2001) 
 
Source: Teixeira (2011) 
 
Economically and socially the 1980s and 90s was marked by chaos. The foreign debt forced 
the reduction of imports, which made unemployment rise to high levels, and an accelerating 
inflation would become the public enemy number one. The administration of the day sought 
to combat it through The Cruzado Plan. With this plan prices and wages were frozen and a 
new currency (the cruzado) replaced the old currency (the cruzeiro) with a value ratio of 
1,000:1. It worked immediately, but because the price freeze was maintained for too long and 
the wage adjustments were too large, the inflation accelerated again and there was a return 
of indexation, and consequently the already high inflation deteriorated into hyperinflation 
between 1990-94.Several plans similar to the theCruzado Plan came into being, introducing 
the currency CruzadosNovos in 1989, the return of Cruzeiros in 1990, and finally the new 
CruzeirosReais in 1993. All of these plans failed. 
 
When president Franco appointed his fourth finance minister, the choice fell on the foreign 
minister at the time, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. He was known as a prominent sociologist 
and writer who had taught at the Sorbonne University in France, where he was in exile, and 
in the early years of the dictatorship he was an outspoken opponent of the regime. As finance 
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minister he put together a group of young, pragmatic economists, who by December 1993 
announced the Plano Real, which came to effectively fight inflation and bring with it structural 
changes that came to make up the cornerstones of a new Brazil. 
 !  
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5. The New Brazil 
5.1 Cardoso’s Plano Real and Liberalization 
Plano Real was not much different from the CruzadoPlan, the change was that it was 
discussed immediately with Congress as well as in the public, providing the necessary 
support. The plan consisted of an equilibrium budget, which was quickly approved by 
congress, a process of general indexation of prices, and the introduction of the new currency, 
the Real, which was pegged to the US Dollar (Roett 2010: 103). 
Along with these reforms, a general tax increase of 5 percent was implemented across the 
board and a Social Emergency Fund was created. This fund received 15 percent of all tax 
receipts, which it would use on the marginal groups that would be hit by the fiscal 
adjustments, securing social responsibility in the plan. Last but not least, a US$7 billion cut 
on government investments, personnel, and state companies would bring down public 
expenditures. 
The Plano Real was an immediate success, and consequently Cardoso could declare his 
candidacy and soon became president – he took office January 1st 1995 and remained in 
this position until 2002. He ran against Lula, who was turned down, but would reoccur in 
coming elections. Riordan Roett (2010:90) captures the success of Cardoso by bluntly stating, 
“For the first time, the country had an intelligent, pragmatic leader who understood the 
importance of both placating the traditional political class and fending off pressure to print 
money and break the bank.” 
 
The success of Plano Real enabled Cardoso to push through “revolutionary” constitutional 
changes, which would effectively open up the economy to international trade and capital 
movements. Now Brazilian and foreign private companies could compete more freely in 
areas such as oil, gas, telecommunications, shipping and more. Economically this meant 
increased competitiveness and modernization, politically it marked a break with former 
policies, and according to Roett it laid “the groundwork for Brazil’s eventual emergence as a 
BRIC” (2010: 90). 
 
Still, several elements of the plan were in line with past ideas. Downsizing the public sector 
and selling off state-owned enterprises (SOEs) represented the continuation of a process that 
had been followed since the late 1970s. Former president Collor de Mello initiated the 
National Privatization Program in March 1990, and after him President Franco continued his 
policies. Under Cardoso the privatization process was amplified, and especially SOEs owned 
by the municipalities, which were responsible for most of the state-owned enterprise deficit, 
were sold to private entities (ibid.: 92). While initially many people were against privatization 
and saw it as a neoliberal policy, it gained support as most privatizations resulted in success 
over the years. Privatization happened in several sectors, some of which were mining, steel 
industry, railway lines, railroad equipment, regional state banks, and multiple energy 
companies and utilities (Ernst & Young Terco 2011: 12). 
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One could say that Cardoso successively embraced the “Washington Consensus” policies, 
which were built on the ideal of complete market liberalization and reliance on foreign capital. 
These policies sought the reduction of financial imbalances and inflation, opening up the 
economy to international trade, undertaking deregulation, developing domestic capital 
markets, and privatizing SOEs (Roett 2010: 103). But as Cardoso simultaneously instituted 
social funds and policies to address poverty reduction, education, and institutional 
transparency, which were areas that the consensus did not address at all, labeling Cardoso a 
“Washington Consensus” president would be downright wrong. Cardoso initiated the 
BolsaEscola at municipal and state level, which gave stipends to poor families to keep their 
children in school; He acknowledged racism as a national problem, which had been 
overlooked for centuries; He made efforts to spur a land reform; He struggled with 
international drug companies; And he made an innovative domestic program to combat AIDS. 
All these initiations marked a new policy, which sought to create a social safety net, 
preventing the poor or those vulnerable to shocks and poverty from falling below a certain 
poverty level, like it is the case in the liberal welfare model of the United Kingdom. Many of 
Cardoso’s initiatives paved the way for Lula’s soon-to-be-famous social programs, which 
aimed at to enabling people to participate and consume, thus somewhat resembling the 
social democratic model. In this respect, Cardoso’s policies initiated what will someday 
evolve into a Brazilian welfare model. 
 
In mid 1995 the Cardoso administration presented a constitutional amendment to fight tax 
evasion, which at this point counted for a US$40-60 billion loss every year, and in the same 
period work was put into a Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), which was finally approved in 
May 2000. The FRL was one of the most important laws of Cardoso, since it seriously 
countered the irresponsible public spending mentality. At this point in history overspending in 
all levels of the bureaucracy was the common practice, and public servants simply just 
expected the government to print money or otherwise cover the shortcomings. This created 
both inflation and debt, so when the FRL introduced strict punishment of public officials who 
did not meet the budget requirements, it resulted in stronger fiscal institutions and established 
a broad framework of fiscal planning execution, and transparency at both the federal, state, 
and municipal level. (Roett 2010: 93) 
 
Brazil’s new open economy made it endangered by external shocks, so when the Mexican 
peso crisis hit the Americas and East Asia in 1994-95 followed by the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, Brazil was severely hit and went into a financial crisis in 1999. Even though the 
administration reacted quickly with successful counter-measures, which hindered inflation, 
the economy, which also suffered under the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001, 
proved to be a major distraction for the Cardoso government. Cardoso’s further reform plans 
to cut down on the still high public debt frightened congress, which consequently opposed 
him. Therefore, a much needed social security reform, tax reform, and cut on public payrolls 
and civil service pension systems met opposition and was left for coming presidents to solve. 
When Cardoso was elected for his 2nd term in office he suddenly represented a minority 
political bloc, making it even more difficult to push through reforms, which made him 
increasingly unpopular. 
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In the meantime the peoples in Latin America had grown tired of governments who sought to 
fix the economy and not the civil society. The election of Hugo Cháves in Venezuela in 1998 
was a clear picture on this, and in the election of late 2002 the Brazilians were ready for a 
change as well, and many of Cardoso’s accomplishments were forgotten, leaving the stage 
open for the left wing party PT, which was led by LuizInácio Lula da Silva, better known as 
Lula. 
 
5.2 Lula’s Social Agenda 
Being the first left wing president since the 1960s, Lula was already very popular with the 
people before the election, all the while creating serious concern in the international financial 
press. But immediately after he got elected (with more than 60 percent of the vote) he 
pursued a moderate liberal economic policy, and therefore he met support from all the parties, 
which pursued a center position. In fact, the parties in congress allied with Lula to support “an 
economic agenda so orthodox that his presidency was dubbed ‘Cardoso’s third term’” 
(Kingstone & Power 2008: 82). In the respect of getting political support, he was already from 
early on more favored by fortune than his predecessor, who had to rely on traditional regional 
bosses to approve his legislation (Roett 2010: 106-7). 
Though Cardoso had effectively fought off the inflation hazard and continued the necessary 
fiscal cut on public expenditures, he still passed on to Lula an external debt of 45 percent of 
GDP, and a public debt of almost 60 percent of GDP. Also, the foreign reserves had declined 
to below US$40 billion, and still, international investors had not recovered from the dramatic 
collapse in Argentina in 2001-02. In short, still much work had to be done to stabilize the 
Brazilian economy. 
 
To solve these problems, Lula teamed up with finance minister AntônioPalocci and the 
Central Bank president Henrique Meirelles, who was the former president of BankBoston in 
the United States. Together they pursued a policy where interest rates were kept high and 
the continuity with the inflation-targeting policies since 1999 were maintained. This was 
endorsed in the October 2003 Goldman Sachs report, but still, as it also stated, Brazil needed 
to open the economy for more trade, increase investment and savings, and reduce public 
and foreign debt, which remained much higher than the other BRICs. (ibid.: 111) 
 
 
With political support, Lula, unlike Cardoso, was able to push through a structural reform to 
change the expensive and bureaucratic social security system. This nonetheless, would a 
few years later turn into the much debated mensalão scandal, since many members of 
congress had received payments in turn for voting in favor of the bill. Many government 
officials close to Lula got fired because of this, while Lula was not implicated, hence he was 
dubbed “the Teflon president”. 
Also, a much-needed unification of the tax system was introduced under Lula, effectively 
instituting five tax rates in Brazil contrary to the former 44 different tax rates. Lastly, a 
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temporary financial transaction tax put in action under president Franco (when Cardoso was 
Finance Minister) was made permanent. 
 
On the social-political front, Lula instated his much-renowned social program BolsaFamília 
(family basket) in October 2003. The program incorporated and expanded Cardoso’s 
BolsaEscola program, and it brought conditional cash transfers to families with children, 
establishing a minimum standard of living. Wendy Hunter & Natasha Borges Sugiyama 
(2009: 46-48) partially credit the program for: 
● A decline in poverty and extreme poverty 
● A decline in Gini coefficient 
● Slight improvements in income inequality 
● Higher school enrollment of young children 
● All this for only 2.5 percent of all government expenditures 
● In 2006, roughly 44 million of Brazil’s poorest had benefited from the program 
● In 2009 the program reached almost 11 million Brazilians 
It is widely acknowledged that these changes led to a significant growth of the middle class. A 
significant social mobility from classes D+E to class C happened under Lula: Class D+E 
comprised 51 percent of the population in 2005, but shrank to 39 percent in 2008, while 
Class C grew from 34 percent to 46 percent (Gouvea 2012: 717). This means that more 
people adopt a middle-class lifestyle, which, according to Brainard and Martinez-Diaz (2009: 
4) will generate sustained demand “for those commodities and manufactures for which Brazil 
has a competitive edge, ranging from beef to regional aircraft.” 
 
At the end of Lula’s first term the economy was given high points by investors and multilateral 
organizations, inflation was under control, and GDP had grown from 1.15 percent in 2003 to 
5.71 percent the year after, which was led by an industrial expansion of 7.89 percent. (Roett 
2010: 114) This, and the flagship achievement of BolsaFamília assured Lula a 2nd term in 
office. His voters had changed from being his traditional better-educated and higher-income 
urban voters to the poor in the north, who believed in his social agenda. He did not win as 
overwhelmingly as the first time, and therefore faced difficult obstacles in building a 
supportive coalition, as it had been the case for many presidents before him. 
 
Some observers argue that the infamous mensalão scandal had actually liberated Lula to 
pursue a more personal goal of international travel and diplomacy, since he was freed from 
many of his domestic duties. Thus, the important process of raising the Brazil’s international 
standing, which had been initiated by Cardoso, accelerated (ibid.: 106-7). This was truly so, 
as at this point it was taken for granted that Brazil’s president would be included in nearly all 
the important meetings on global issues, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
 
When Lula’s 2nd term was nearing its end in 2010, Lula was widely popular and 
acknowledged home and abroad for both his economic and social reforms. The economy 
kept growing, and when international reserves grew from US$49.3 billion in 2003 to 
US$180.3 billion in ultimo 2007, Brazil for the first time in January 2008 became a net foreign 
creditor whereas before it had been the world’s largest emerging market debtor. Lastly, the 
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balance in the public and external balance sheets had greatly reduced Brazil’s vulnerability to 
external shocks. (ibid.:116) 
 
Overall, one can say that Brazil’s macroeconomic stability was deepened through the two 
consecutive presidential periods of Cardoso and Lula, and moreover several observers agree 
that this development have led to a significant poverty reduction. According to Gouvea (2012: 
717) job creation (9.9 million from 2002 to 2010), increasing minimum wages, stable 
macroeconomic environment over two decades and high growth was responsible for a 10 
percent increase of average family income between 2002 and 2010. Under Cardoso, mainly 
because of Plano Real, poverty declined from 44.1 percent to 33.2 percent. This level was 
further reduced to 22.9 percent in 2010. (ibid.) 
 
5.3 Dilma Rousseff, Merely a Continuation? 
Through a successful presidential campaign against Governor José Serra in 2011, Dilma 
Rousseff became the president in office, who should face these challenges. Becoming the 
first female president in Brazil, Rousseff was previously best known for being both Chief of 
Staff and Minister of Energy during Lula’s presidency. Rousseff has through her first 
presidential period been attributed for following in the footsteps of Lula’s previous 
government when it comes to domestic policies - an accusation that is only partly true (Sader 
2011). Both representing Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), it is only natural that Lula and 
Rousseff share common political views on several topics.Still, Rousseff differs from Lula. Just 
like her two predecessors, Rousseff has followed the path of Plano Real with care for the 
eventual variations in the dreaded inflation rate with success, but the Rousseff administration 
has now started to open up for a monetary policy less focused on fighting inflation (The 
Economist 2012d). To some extent, Rousseff follow the same ideas of market and state 
relations as Lula; that state interventions fosters the domestic market (Gouvea 2012: 722). 
Still, Rousseff introduced tax cuts and opening for the possibility for private companies to be 
incorporated in social government investments and buying previously government owned 
infrastructure, such as roads, railroads, and airplanes (BBC 2012). Throughout Rousseff’s 
term, government interventions and investments have been dominated by even more 
enthusiastic public investments into infrastructure and social projects than seen under Lula’s 
presidency. The Rousseff’s government has particularly been targeting infrastructure with the 
intention to create the foundation for a more market competitive Brazil, but has also been 
focusing on not only social infrastructure, aiming to pull more people out of poverty (ibid.). 
Infrastructure is but one example to the increase in interventions on Brazilian markets done 
by the Rousseff government. For instance, Rousseff has initiated an interventionist strategy 
in open to start numerous manufacturing enterprises such as car factories in order to secure 
new jobs and commodities for the domestic market (Sader 2011). 
Despite the Rousseff’s government interference in domestic markets for the sake of 
competitiveness and protect industries, the current government of Brazil is not only upkeep 
the social reforms created during Lula’s term, but are also initiating new social programs. E.g. 
this is seen when the Rousseff administration protected Lula’s Growth Acceleration Program 
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from tax cuts but instead initiated a series of huge social programs such as the US$ 5.7 
billion RedeCegonha (The Stork Program), which is supposed to help poor women with 
newborn children (ibid.). 
While the previous mentioned “Mensalão” scandal is still ongoing well into Rousseff’s term, 
accusing several leading party members of corruption and severely damaging parts of the PT, 
Rousseff and most of her administration has managed not to get intertwined (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2012: 3). Instead, Rousseff has launched several programs in order to 
confront corruption in the public and private sector and in the government’s bureaucracy, 
initiating a struggle against one the nation’s oldest enemies, corruption. 
Returning to the above-mentioned point, Rousseff can to a certain extent be said to have 
continued the political path, which has been created by her two male predecessors. Still, 
Rousseff and her government has through their politics managed to deviate from these 
predecessors by not only upholding the political path laid out in front of them in the shape of 
Plano Real, but also managed to expand it by enabling further investments and interventions 
in the market and enlarge social initiatives. 
 
5.4 A Common Path 
Brazil has without a doubt benefited under the three above mentioned presidents’ terms. 
Before Cardoso, Brazil suffered from a various number of different presidents and 
governments, all of which were characterized by two aspects; holding power for a short term 
and having widely different politics, particularly on economics (Roett 2010: 148). This resulted 
in Brazil switching economic and social policies often, thereby creating not only an unstable 
political climate, but also creating uncertainty on the markets. Since Cardoso and the Plano 
Real, Brazil has followed the same political path, both through Lula’s term and Rousseff’s 
ongoing term. This has to a large extent helped stabilizing the country by creating strong 
center-right and center-left coalitions in the parliament, both supporting the route of Plano 
Real, strict economic policies and an emphasis on social policies (ibid.: 151-152). This has 
resulted in two stabilizing outcomes for the country; (1) a huge public and political support for 
the political center orientated path, which enables policy makers to make important changes 
relatively unhindered, and (2) recent political landscape and continuation of this common 
path has to a large degree created a path dependency1 situation for Brazil, which are likely to 
insure further steps down the designated policy road. This path, combined with the focus on 
corruption and the social-economic policies, aiming on strengthening the middle class and 
combatting poverty, are laying a foundation for a politically stable Brazil.  
 
5.5 Brazil’s Regional and Global Agenda 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1The term ´path dependency´refers to institutionalist theory, which refers to the idea that an individual, group or organization’s 
current possibility to make a choice is limited by previous decision, even though past circumstances no longer apply to the 
current circumstances.  
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This section addresses the foreign policy agenda of the “New Brazil”. It will look into the 
international strategies of the last presidencies and how Brazil’s role in foreign policy has 
changed accordingly. As the section only provides a brief account it merely creates the 
foundation for an analysis of Brazil’s new global role based on current trends that are visible 
in the “New Brazil”. 
 
During Cardoso, Brazil renewed its foreign policy, however from 2002 Brazil started to play a 
more significant role in international forums. A new international strategy came with the Lula 
administration and he combined Brazil’s domestic strategy with its foreign policy. Lula 
showed a more active approach towards foreign policies and implemented a more state 
active interference in the economy to secure a strong Brazil and to minimize the risk that the 
globalization would bring (Christensen 2010: 4). This chapter will therefore be based on the 
new international strategy during Lula.  
 
Brazil’s international strategies can be divided into three categories; the regional; South 
American level, South-South relations outside the region and the North-South relation. All 
relations takes place on a bilateral and multilateral level. Below we will discuss Brazil’s role 
within Mercosur and question Brazil as a regional leader, furthermore the prioritization of a 
stronger link to other developing countries is discussed and if this has affected Brazil’s 
relation to North-countries such as the United States.  
 
5.5.1 Brazil as a regional power 
Through its history, Brazil did not experience a close relationship to their region. But in 1991 
the relationship between Argentina and Brazil improved with the reestablishment of 
democracy in both countries and with the formation of Mercosur (Spektor 2010 in 
Christensen 2010: 4).  
The cooperation in Mercosur was facing difficulties in the late 1990s as a result of economic 
crises in the countries. On these grounds, Mercosur was seen as not sustainable and the 
durability of Mercosur was questioned. Meanwhile, Mercosur got to play a significant role in 
the Lula administration and a new path for regional cooperation opened up, certainly if you 
look at the official statement from Lula in 2003:  
 
“The greatest priority of our foreign policy during my government will be the building of a 
politically stable, prosperous and united South America founded upon the ideals of 
democracy and social justice. To this end, decisive action is required to revitalize Mercosur”  
(Lula 2003 in Christensen 2010: 5).  
 
Already during Cardoso, South America was mentioned as a new platform for Brazil to gain 
competitiveness in the global economy. According to a survey (Brazil’s International Agenda 
Revisited) made by Amaury Souza (2008: 22), the foreign political elite in Brazil seek to 
strengthen Brazil’s position in its region and around 54 percent of the elite believes that the 
role of Mercosur is crucial for their bargaining power towards United States and EU. In 2007, 
the establishment of UNASUR joined together all South American countries to create a new 
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forum for cooperation, special focused on physical integration within infrastructure, energy 
and social cooperation. Moreover, UNASUR has created the South American Defence 
Council, which is a clear indicator on not wanting the US to interfere in South American 
relations (Christensen 2010: 5). Generally, UNASUR can be seen as a new platform for 
Brazil to gain political power in its region and establish new economic relations with other 
South American countries. Brazil has as well, increased their trade with other Latin American 
countries in the last years which has had a huge influence on Brazil’s economy, this will be 
further analyzed in chapter 7.  
 
According to the survey about Brazil’s foreign policy, three top priorities are mentioned as 
most important for Brazil in relation to South America. First, strengthen the democracy in the 
region, second, develop the physical integration and on a third place the wish for Brazil to 
become a regional leader (Souza 2008). It is interesting that the guarantee of democracy in 
the region is placed as first priority with 74 percent. Even though the survey is not 
representative for the whole Brazil, it still indicates that Brazil has a very democratic approach 
towards development in the Latin American region and this underlines the understanding of 
Brazil as having a stabilizing function in South America (Christensen 2010: 6).  
 
Nonetheless, there are different opinions whether Brazil can be seen as a regional leader 
(ibid.: 6). An example is Brazil’s wish for getting a seat in the United Nation Security Council, 
which Argentina does not support and this could indicate that the Latin American region is still 
not close to becoming a strong unit, which promotes a shared agenda. Moreover, Mercosur 
has been facing serious challenges, with Argentina refusing to further open up their markets 
to industrial imports and Brazil still maintaining protectionist demands complicates the 
opportunities for Mercosur. It so been stated from the foreign Ministry of Brazil:  
 
“Brazil’s Foreign Ministry made its mark in a manner that raises serious questions about 
Mercosur. The bloc’s trajectory has been notable for disconnected movements. Sometimes it  
veers towards deepening and greater consolidation as a customs union  and at others 
towards a shallower broadening via the acceptance of new members. Through a failure to 
reach agreement on internal trade conditions and their aversion to sharing foreign policy 
positions, Brazil and Argentina have limited Mercosur’s capacity to negotiate as a bloc or to 
draw up a consistent strategy for regional integration”  (Souza 2008: 5). 
 
Furthermore, the FTAA failing has cleared a way for the United States to negotiate bilateral 
agreements with several South American countries. And thereby have increased a range of 
the North American (NAFTA) and Central American (CAFTA) free trade agreements. And 
new state-centralizing and anti-US governments in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua lined up 
alongside Venezuela to form the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) “as a 
counterbalance to US influence” (Souza 2008: 5). The decline of FTAA is an indication of 
another path that Brazil was choosing during Lula, which favored economic integration on a 
continental basis that excluded the United States to a certain extent (Roett 2010: 129). 
UNASUR can be seen as this new political and economic strategy, which resulted in a more 
flexible and pragmatic unit (Bernal-Meza 2010: 196). It can be concluded that Brazil has big 
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potential for becoming a regional leader because of the strong focus on Latin American 
countries and the two institutions, Mercosur and UNASUR.  Despite, Brazil faces challenges 
within Mercosur it is clear how it has been a high priority for Lula as well as for the foreign 
political elite in Brazil, stating that the South American relation is of highest priority. This leads 
to the next priority within Brazil’s foreign policy, the South-South relation, which will be 
focused below.  
 
5.5.2 South-South relations 
The term BRIC was introduced in 2011, a term which has come into widespread use of 
emerging economies, in this case Brazil, Russia, India and China. This analysis focuses on 
Brazil’s strategy to strengthen its South-South relations and its alliances that it has made with 
the Global South and emerging economies. 
 
Through the last decade, Brazil has increased its cooperation with other countries of the 
Global South. To strengthen Brazil’s ties with other developing countries of the South has 
been an important priority for Lula since he took office (Christensen 2010: 7). Brazil has 
sought a diplomatic strategy, by showing solidarity towards other developing countries and 
Brazil’s leading role in the UN campaign ‘Action against Hunger and Poverty’ was an emblem 
of this (Lima, Hirst 2006: 36). Brazil has increased its cooperation with African countries and 
in general Brazil is looking for new partners in the international society in relation to trade, 
technology and energy cooperation. Looking into the South-South relation it becomes central 
to focus on the active performance that has been in the developing countries. Lula was a 
very visible president in foreign policy showing the international society that Brazil has a say 
and want to take part in international decisions and forums. A central part of Brazil becoming 
an active player was to increase its trading cooperation with other countries and this 
influenced Brazil’s trading pattern:  
 
“In 2002 50 percent of Brazil’s trade was with US and EU, which meant that Brazil was very 
dependent on these export markets, this has changed with the increasing south-cooperations. 
A strategy for Brazil was therefore to diversify their trading partners to insure less 
dependency to these markets” (Christensen 2010: 8). 
 
To strengthen the South-South relation the strategy for Brazil is to become less dependent 
from their previous trading partners (US and EU) and try to seek new and more equal trading 
partners. In 2009 the trade with EU and US has decreased to 32.5 percent and trade with 
Asian, African, and Arab countries has increased (Christensen 2010: 8). Lula has stated that 
trade with South-countries would be more beneficial than trade with the North-countries. As 
Brazil would have a better opportunity to sell their manufacturing goods to Africa and Latin 
America than to EU and US, according to Christensen (2010: 9) the reason is that Brazil 
would have a center-periphery relation trading with EU and US. But, the South-South trade is 
not necessary equal either, as Brazil for instance has a trade surplus dominated by industrial 
export and imports of raw materials in relation with Latin America. On the other hand Brazil’s 
trading relation to China indicates a ‘center-periphery’ relation, further elaborated in chapter 7.  
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Besides the strong focus on equal trade partners, Brazil aim to increase its power in other 
aspects. In 2003, IBSA2 Dialogue Forum was created. The focus was mainly on trade and 
technological areas, but is has also been stated that it will try to change the power structures 
of today (ibid.: 9). All three countries lobbying for a seat in United Nation Security Council can 
be seen as an example. Lima and Hirst (2006: 36) describe IBSA as follow:  
 
“The purpose of IBSA was to develop a strategic partnership among developing countries 
around three shared interests: (1) the commitment to democratic institutions and values; (2) 
the effort to link the struggle against poverty to development policies; and (3) the conviction 
that multilateral institutions and procedures should be strengthened in order to cope with 
turbulence in the economic, political and security fields”   
 
Brazil operates for a stronger cooperation among emerging countries, to become a strong 
player in the international institutions. Brazil intention is to create a more balanced structure 
both in the UN and in WTO. A counteract towards the current power balance was also 
questioned after the Doha round in 2001. Hereafter, the G20 was rising in power and in 2009 
the G20 replaced the G8 as the primary economic council of the world richest nations. 
Several times Brazil has been called the leader for the third world countries, when fighting for 
their rights to become an equal part of the international system (Christensen 2010: 10). It has 
increased the relation to South-countries with the intention to seek new trading partners and 
to challenges the current power structures. Brazil desires to influence the international arena 
and to be considered as an important player, but in the terms of soft power, as Brazil has 
eschewed the development of hard power and especially of military power. As mentioned 
earlier Brazil’s choice of seeking new international relations is clearly affecting its previous 
relations, which leads is to the next discussion.  
 
5.5.3 North-South Relation 
Brazil’s increasing cooperation in South America as well in the South-South relations does 
clearly have an effect in their relation to United States. On the one hand, it can be argued 
that Brazil now has the opportunity to choose more freely foreign strategy without being 
dependent on North-countries to the same extend as earlier. On the other hand, it can be 
argued that Brazil has had a very negative approach towards United States, taking the FTAA 
in consideration (ibid: 11). Moreover, it is important to notice that the US-Brazil relations have 
become more complex on both side, economic, political, military and cultural interests have 
led to more openness from each side. Brazil, seeking for new trade partners, can be seen as 
if it wants to be less dependent on their previous trading partners, which in this case is the 
United States. Though, it is still important to remember that Brazil is not seeking for a total 
independency towards United States. In this link Lima and Hirst (2006: 33) points out:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 India, Brazil and South Africa  
32 
“For the United States, the importance of Brazil in world politics and international security is 
small, especially when compared to crucial allies such as Canada and the UK, or to other 
states such as Germany, Japan and Russia. For Brazil, the picture is very different. Brazil 
keeps a permanent watch on the United States and what it does in world politics, and its 
foreign policy decisions consistently involve an assessment of the costs and benefits of 
convergence with or divergence from the US” 
 
From this perspective, it important to remember that even though Brazil is an emerging power 
and plays a significant role in the Latin American region, there is more factors that must be 
included when discussing the developed relation between US and Brazil. Though, the 
increasing power Brazil is gaining in South America will to a large extent have an influence on 
United States in the regional trade as well in security issues (Lime and Hirst: 2006: 34).  
Though, there has been a more positive attitude towards Brazil, since the Lula took office 
(Lima and Hirst, 2006: 35). Furthermore, several positive examples in Brazil’s relationship to 
North-countries can be mentioned. Brazil hassought a bilateral cooperation concerning 
biofuel production with both United State and EU, the EU trade agreement in 2007 and the 
increasing interest in Brazil biofuel production from several countries is providing more 
opportunities for cooperation. In conclusion, Brazil has by their increasing cooperation with 
other emerging countries made themselves less dependent on North-relations as US and EU, 
though both countries are today still big trading partners of Brazil, cf. chapter 7. The relation 
towards North-countries will probably continue to change as Brazil continues to seek power in 
several international forums, such as WTO, UN and on a regional level, Mercosur. It is 
evident how Brazil is seeking new partners to gain more power and the long-term cooperation 
between the developing countries can have a serious say. If they prevent their alliances to 
fail, Brazil could be playing a big role in the global stage demanding for more political power. 
 
5.6 Summing up: The Political Path of Brazil 
This chapter has looked into the establishment of the political path of Brazil. The overall 
political path was founded with the establishment of Plano Real, which has enabled 
significant growth in Brazil. While the presidential terms of respectively Cardoso, Lula and 
Rousseff has differentiated to some extent, particularly with the degree of state intervention 
and social reforms, these presidents has managed to lay the foundation for a common path 
and more economic stability. 
It has furthermore been argued that these changes together with an increasing focus on 
corruption have fostered a more politically stable Brazil. Following these analyses, Brazil’s 
regional and global political relations are investigated. It is discovered that Brazil has 
changed its main foreign policy focus since the last decade and is now increasingly seeking 
away from North-South relations, and instead increasingly seek to strengthen its relations 
with regional partners as well as South-South countries. Furthermore, Brazil is also seeking 
increasing influence on the global scene, continuing its struggle to obtain a permanent seat in 
the UN Security Council. 
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6. State intervention, booming economy, and 
remaining challenges 
In the era of “The New Brazil”, the three presidents Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff have 
intervened in the economy and tried to solve several structural problems. Contrary to the 
authoritarian regime’s focus on market forces and growth rates on the expense of social 
rights, the “new presidents” have focused on a more intervening state, which seeks growth 
through improving social rights such as labor policies, school attendance, and poverty 
alleviation. By doing this the presidents have managed to further deepen macroeconomic 
stability and remove some structural barriers to further prepare Brazil to become an emerging 
global power. Even though the domestic changes have influenced Brazil’s position as a 
global power, it faces many challenges in several political-economic areas and specific 
sectors, and many present-day risks are threatening the sustainability of the the newfound 
stability. When trying to measure in how far Brazil will maintain its global power position and 
how it will develop in the future, it is of utmost importance to look at these challenges as well 
as prospects in a long-term perspective. Topics such as education, skilled labor, and 
infrastructure will be analyzed in this respect. 
 
The following notions will be used in this chapter without further in-depth explanation: Political 
stability, path dependence, competitiveness, globalization, and growing global middle class. 
 
6.1 Increasing Consumer Class 
Brazil has experienced an enormous increase in their consumer class through the last 
decade. There has been a huge reduction in poverty and inequality. Since 2008, 20 mio. 
Brazilians have left poverty and moved into the middle class. The extreme poverty in Brazil 
was decreased from 12 percent in 2003 to 4.8 percent in 2008 (Christensen 2010). This is 
mainly caused by the big focus on poverty reduction of the Lula administration and three key 
policies must be addressed to explain how this reduction could be achieved. The three key 
policies is 1) cash grants program to the poor, 2) Aid to small-size farming, 3) Labor and 
pensions reforms (Ansell 2011). 
During Lula’s campaign in 2002 the ‘Zero Hunger’ program was introduced; a program, which 
included many different aspects in how to reduce poverty, which included, health, land 
reforms and many other initiatives, most prominent of which was the cash grant program from 
BolsaFamília. 
The cash grant program already started during Cardoso, the most important program would 
be the BolsaEscola (School Benefit) program. It promoted school attendance among poor 
families, by giving parents about US$8-10 each month for every child who attended school. 
This compensated parents for the loss of their children's labor (Ansell 2011). Lula tried to 
create a cash grant program as well, which should benefit the poor families. The program 
was called Food Card, and it gave families about US$17 per month in 2003. This essentially 
doubled the amount of federal money that a family could have received from all of Cardoso's 
grants combined. By 2009, families in extreme poverty received up to about US$116 each 
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month. Thereby, Lula reached many more people than Cardoso did, and this was partly 
because the BolsaEscola program only was allocated to the extremely poor, whereas Lula 
also included the ‘moderately’ poor. As a result of these changes, by 2006, BolsaFamília 
program had already reduced extreme poverty in Brazil by 19 percent and moderate poverty 
by 12 percent.  
 
Lula’s Food Card was heavily criticized from both the left and right wing. The right wing 
claimed that the administrative costs were too high, and the left wing said that it denied poor 
people the right to spend their money as they wished. All programs were therefore put into 
the BolsaFamília and replaced spending restrictions for instance the Food Card, with grant 
conditions such as mandatory school attendance, child vaccinations, child health exams, and 
perinatal medical exams for mothers to-be. In addition to improving the economic and 
educational standing of poor families (Ansell 2011), Lula had more success than Cardoso 
with his cash grants program. One of the reasons was that Lula implemented a more 
transparent system in the local municipalities where the money was distributed. Earlier, 
corruption had been a big problem and the money was not allocated to the right families 
(Ansell 2011). 
 
In addition to BolsaFamília, Lula provided support for Brazilian farmers. During Cardoso, 
National Aid to Family Agriculture Program (PRONAF) was introduced. It includes elements 
such as micro loans and crop purchases, where the state purchases crops from farmers at 
proper market price. Lula continued the program and by 2005 the number of people that got 
support had doubled. But Brazil is still facing problems with poverty, especially with rural 
development in Northern Brazil, which today is the poorest region. Many farmers do not have 
arable land and therefore land reforms must be implemented to overcome the huge poverty 
in the rural areas.  
 
Lula also made big reforms on the labor and pension area. First, he reestablished legislations 
that enshrined some protections for the Unified Workers Central (CUT), he reduced the 
power of the labor courts to declare strikes illegal and squashed Cardoso's proposal to allow 
collective bargaining to undermine the protections enshrined in labor legislation (Ansell 2011). 
Lula also raised the monthly minimum wages and with the inflation staying steady in that 
period, less than 10 percent, it made a big difference for many Brazilians. Lastly, Lula rolled 
back the public pension system that existed under Cardoso. Instead, he created a more 
social system, which taxed the privileged retirees more and created a reform that readjusted 
the formula for calculating pensions to the detriment of all formal workers, however in 2007 
Lula pushed through legislation that extended pension benefits to informal laborers who 
make up more than half of Brazil's workforce. Thus, while many formal workers had their 
pensions reduced, 28 million informal laborers who previously had no social security were 
now entitled to pensions (Ansel 2011). 
 
Lula may have been criticized for approaching the poverty problem with a very conservative 
approach because of a ‘targeted group’ policy that only focused on one segment. But he 
ensured that more than half of Brazil’s population today could be categorized as middle class 
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(Christensen 2010). Despite the big influence of an increasing growth in export, the 
increasing middle class and the social reforms that have been made, have had a big impact 
on Brazil’s economic stabilization. The minimum wage, the social security reforms and the 
high creation of jobs resulted in this stabilization. This created around 10 million jobs in the 
period from 2004 to 2007, of which the majority belonged to the formal economic sector 
(ibid.). Thereby, people who were earlier a part of the informal system, not paying taxes, is 
now contributing with taxes to the formal economic system. This of course has made a big 
difference in Brazil’s booming economy. Not only, have Brazil lifted people out of poverty, but 
also made sure that they are a contributing factor to the economic system today. 
 
Still, the newly arisen middle class can end up being just a small époque for Brazil. Since 
both the country and the middle class is highly dependent on raw material export, particularly 
to China. A sudden decline in the world economy involving Brazil’s primary trade partners 
could therefore shake the county in such a way that the majority of the population, which has 
entered the middle class recently, risk being pushed straight back into poverty. 
 
The social programs and formal job creation have increased the middle class significantly 
and investors believe that the socio-economic upward move of millions of Brazilians has still 
huge potential and increasing consumerism also intensifies competition in the domestic 
economy, promoting competitiveness and innovation (Financial Times 2012c). Nonetheless, 
it also made a relatively uneducated group of the population to consumers without adding 
significantly to Brazilian production, which could create long-term problems for industries 
such as in increase of imports and a lack of skilled labor. This will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 
6.2 Education and Skilled Labor 
Brazil’s ambition to increase medium and high technological value-added production in order 
to become a prosperous economy driven by knowledge and innovation is visible in many of 
its industrial policies. Examples are the long state-owned airplane manufacturer Embraer and 
the protection of industrial production, for instance in car manufacturing, on which this paper 
elaborates at a later point. Education is a crucial factor determining prospects of becoming an 
innovation driven economy (Leher 2010 in Gouvea 2012). Furthermore, education is a crucial 
aspect of social equality and cohesion, enabling children to enter the labor market even if 
they were raised in poverty; thus it also creates abilities for participation. 
 
Lula, who was very successful in reducing poverty and inequality during his eight year term 
(Kliass 2011), but was less successful in addressing the problem of early school drop-outs 
and a generally poor quality of primary and secondary schooling (Bodman et al. 2011: 24-5). 
The Brazilian national education assessment cannot find significant improvement of learning 
between 1995 and 2007. However, Brazilian governments increased spending on education 
between 2000 and 2007 about 66 percent, lifting Brazil’s expenditures on education towards 
5.2 percent of the GDP, which is close to US levels (5.5 percent) and higher than spending in 
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other BRIC countries. Nonetheless, Brazil is outpaced by all of them in the educational level 
of students (ibid.: 24-5). Particularly problematic are early school dropouts of girls starting at 
the age of 12 and increasing until the age of 16, when children are allowed to start working. 
 
The quality of schooling also depends heavily on the state, if it is an urban or rural area, and 
on socioeconomic status. Thus, preparation for the tertiary education where Brazil spends 
traditionally more money is highly unequal. Moreover, the tertiary system seems to be 
overwhelmed with the demand for skilled labor from the Brazilian economy. Gouvea (2012) 
states that only 1 million out of 4 million demanded skilled laborers were available on the 
labor market. Since basic math, reading and writing skills are also limited in the labor force, 
the primary and secondary school system has to improve significantly and training 
capabilities of technical schools have to increase. Failing in these tasks would significantly 
endanger the growth perspectives of Brazil (ibid.). 
 
The Lula presidency fell short of improving training and education. With investing significant 
sums in social welfare programs such as BolsaFamília, it created an increasing middle class 
able to consume and stimulate domestic economy. However, now “continued economic 
growth depends on the country’s ability to convert its massive consumer class into a 
producing one that supports labor demands and generates innovation” (Bodman et al. 2011: 
26). Evidence by Oswald, Doca& Beck demonstrates that skill mismatch and limited 
capabilities of technical schools already create costs and make Brazil less attractive for 
foreign investments. According to these scholars, 900,000 job offers could not be filled in 
2009 because of insufficient skills of candidates (Gouvea 2012). 
 
Dilma Rousseff has to address particularly primary and secondary schooling more 
successfully than her predecessor since increased spending did not bring the expected 
results in the past. According to Vinicius Mariano De Carvalho (2012), the biggest challenge 
for Brazil in the upcoming years will be the lack of educated people that are able to shape the 
Brazil of the future. Brazil needs a workforce that is able to strengthen Brazil’s position in 
innovative industries and services and starts small and medium-sized enterprises that can 
compete on global level. As mentioned in the previous sections Brazil can hardly afford a lack 
of skilled labor and a widely uneducated consumer class which both would penetrate Brazil’s 
efforts of becoming an innovation driven economy. Furthermore, low education might 
undermine political stability since it leads to higher unemployment and might strengthen more 
radical politicians. 
 
6.3 Infrastructure 
Besides from education and the lack of skilled labor, Brazil faces another big challenge. 
Physical Infrastructure is an important component of competitiveness in a globalized world in 
which production chains of products can stretch over continents, but investments for 
production will be only directed to places, which are well connected domestically and 
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internationally. According to P. S. Passos and A. Brito, Brazil’s infrastructure is by most 
observers regarded as a bottleneck for further rapid growth (Gouvea 2012). 
 
The transport network needs significant investments and improvements in all sectors. Only 
10 percent of all roads are paved, there is no integrated rail system, inland waterways are 
inadequately developed and seaports, which send away 95 percent of Brazil’s exports, are 
overaged and ranked on position 123 of 139 countries in the Competitiveness Report of the 
World Economic Forum (WEF). Furthermore, airports are operating at capacity limits in cargo 
as well as passenger service, for instance São Paulo’s international airport is among world’s 
worst airports in terms of delays (Bodman, Wolfensohn&Sweig 2011: 22-4). 
 
Gouvea (2012) argues that Brazilian infrastructure in general is too dependent on highway 
transportation. Roads handle 61 percent of transportation, while railroads make up for 20 
percent. Most roads are in very poor condition (65 percent) and important transport routes of 
agricultural goods remained unpaved since the 1950s, making transportation more expensive 
and adding considerable costs on agricultural production (Doca & Paul 2010 in Gouvea 2012: 
720). Accordingly, “the poor state of road connection was deeply penalizing Brazil’s main 
exporting products/commodities” (Gouvea 2012: 720). 
 
The government of course also recognized these constraints on competitiveness and Lula’s 
administration initiated an Accelerated Growth Program (PAC) with a volume of US$283 
billion for the period between 2007 and 2010. Dilma Rousseff, being already responsible for 
carrying out PAC, initiated also the successor program, PAC II, expanding the volume to 
approximately US$480 billion between 2011 and 2014. According to Bodman et al. (2011: 
23) PAC II would boost infrastructure investments close to 4 or 5 percent of GDP, which is 
required to maintain high growth rates (ibid.). Nonetheless, this only holds in case of full 
implementation and already PAC had great problems with realization. Overall, only 12 
percent of all projects planned under PAC could be finished until 2010 and 70 percent of all 
highway projects are behind schedule (Pereira 2010 & Batista 2010 in Gouvea 2012: 720). 
Major reasons are huge bureaucratic obstacles that prolong the approval and contracting 
phase, but outside the PAC framework a shortage of budgetary resources will also limit 
progress of infrastructure modernization. Transportation networks are only one factor, next to 
it telecommunication, water and electricity supply, sewage treatment, and many other 
aspects of infrastructure are in need for modernization (Gouvea 2012: 720). 
 
Historically, huge distances and a concentration of economic activity on the southern coasts 
made a sufficient physical infrastructure difficult to achieve. Since the coast was the center of 
political attention, it benefitted often more from government spending than the poorer 
Northeastern part. The lack of physical infrastructure imposes costs on those who do 
business in Brazil. Investors therefore refer to the many aspects that make economic activity 
in Brazil more expensive than in other emerging economies as the “Brazil cost” (The 
Economist 2012b). The deficient infrastructure is an important aspect that makes it 
particularly difficult to establish efficient assembly lines over the country and to create higher 
rates of intra-industry trade in the LAC region. 
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Infrastructure investments were too late prioritized in the Lula term. While growth rates rose 
dramatically after 2003, the infrastructure investment ratio remained lower than in the 1970s. 
Only in 2007 Lula launched PAC to address this problem with limited success. The Rousseff 
administration prioritizes bottlenecks of competitiveness which is a change compared to the 
previous government (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012). Still, together with a lack of skilled 
labor, high taxes and an overvalued currency, infrastructure can potentially damage Brazil’s 
growth perspective particularly in industrial production, and furthermore it presents an 
obstacle for the population to reach higher living standards. 
 
6.4 Energy Sector 
Brazil’s growing economy has had the ability to capitalize on two long-term global trends: 
strong commodity demands, driven by the increasing global middle class and the imperative 
of stabilizing the Earth’s climate (Brainard & Diaz 2009: 4). 
 
In recent years, the commodity prices have soared; this is a combination of the increased 
demand for food and raw materials from especially China and other emerging economies and 
a stronger demand for energy supply from the United States among others. Brazil has 
emerged as a major exporter of many of these commodities, especially on soy where Brazil 
has a global market share of almost 40 percent (ibid.: 4). In the upcoming years the world’s 
middle class is predicted to increase and the demand for commodity products will expand. 
Brazil would then be in a position to fulfill these demands. Furthermore, to handle the global 
warming the world is increasing the premium on carbon-efficient energy sources and carbon 
sequestration (ibid.: 4) making Brazil stand in a good position, as it has continuously 
developed its biofuels industry in later years. 
 
Since the 1973 oil shock Brazil has developed its energy sector and the strategy has been a 
success both on a regional and global level. Looking into Brazil’s ethanol program, initiated in 
the 1970s, three important initial drivers for the ethanol industry needs to be mentioned: 
“Guaranteed purchases by Petrobrás, low-interest loans for ethanol firms, and a fixed-price 
schedule that set the price of hydrous ethanol at 59 percent of the price of gasoline at the 
pump“ (Roett, 2010: 120). Policies as these have helped Brazil becoming the world’s second 
largest producer of ethanol with 70 percent of the production together with the United States, 
as well as the largest exporter of sugar-based fuel with nearly 90 percent of ethanol used for 
fuel (ibid.). 
 
The program for ethanol used as fuel has gained even more significance in later years, and 
at least three factors have influenced this: Increase in international oil prices, the 
development of biofuel motors, and the flexfuel, which allow to adjust the proportion of 
gasoline and ethanol in cars tanks. Today no new cars in Brazil run on pure gasoline 
(Brainard& Diaz 2009:24). 
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Moreover, Brazil has managed to secure that half of the big oil company Petrobrás is owned 
by the state, and recently Petrobrás discovered the offshore oil field named Pré-Sal. With 
these new finds Brazil is secured a state surplus on oil, and it will make Brazil one of the five 
or six countries with the highest estimated petroleum reserves. Thereby Brazil becomes 
bigger than Canada and Mexico (Roett, 2010: 120). 
 
Energy is one of the most politicized sectors of Brazil’s economy. Years ago Brazil chose to 
prioritize the energy sector with a great support from the state in both domestic and 
international markets. Some of the contributing factors have been the highly oligopolistic 
nature of the market and the sector’s tendency to form national monopolies (Brainard& Diaz 
2009: 18).  
At the same time, the energy market is strongly affected by economic and technical 
restrictions as well as by the constraints of resource availability, which can affect the 
country’s strategy, both domestically and internationally. Brainard and Diaz (2009) mention at 
least five factors that can secure a strong energy strategy: 
 
“(1) The quantity and quality of reserves or natural energy resources; (2) technological 
capacity, which corresponds to the entire energy chain, encompassing extraction, 
refining, hydroelectric power stations, transportation, and the like; (3) capital 
availability, because it is a capital-intensive sector and scale capacity is fundamental 
in this market; (4) the energy transportation infrastructure (mainly ducts and cables); 
and (5) access to consumer markets” (Brainard and Diaz, 2009: 19). 
 
Despite this, countries with all five factors are very rare and are mostly seen as the so-called 
major energy powers and big-oil and gas exporting countries (ibid.). Usually, countries are 
forced to import theses resources on the international market. Such factors are also playing a 
tremendous role in a country’s international strategy, as it has many costs. Brazil’s major 
focus in the energy sectors entails a new global platform and maneuvering room for Brazil to 
act in many international forums, as bio-energy is in many countries interest.  
 
In terms of energy supplies, Brazil’s energy production is different from other countries’ 
production. As seen in Graph 6.1 Brazil is positioned far above the world average in terms of 
the use of renewable energy sources, especially comparing with countries in the OECD. 
 
Graph 6.1 Domestic Energy Supply 
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Source: Brainard& Diaz 2009 
 
Brazil achieved its large share of renewable energy resources through intensive use of 
biomass and hydroelectricity, which, combined accounted for 45.8 percent of its energy 
production in 2007 (ibid.: 21).Compared to world or OECD average, Brazil can await 
increasing energy prices or crises like those of the 1970s without much concern. Their high 
share of renewables make them independent from world prices for oil or gas and give them a 
strong position in climate change negotiations. Furthermore, Brazil can play a major role in 
assisting developing countries through technology transfer, which serves its South-South 
strategy. Overall, independence in this field might become a rare comfort in the twenty-first 
century, which adds to the sustainability of Brazil’s economy and bolster its international 
standing.  
 
The continued growth of Petrobrás’ technological has brought them to be one of the most 
recognized state-owned oil companies in the world (Roett 2010: 121). Furthermore, the rise 
of the ethanol sector globally positioned Brazil as the leading country in this field (Christensen 
2010). The cooperation on bio-energy is also shown in the strategic partnership between 
Brazil and EU, where the main focus is on spreading production and technologies to partners 
in Africa (European Commission 2007). The continuous rise in oil and gas production, the 
growth of Petrobrás and the leap forward taken by the national biofuel industry are 
comprising a patterns of a new Brazil positioned as global energy player in the twenty-first 
century. 
6.5 Summing up: Changes and Challenges 
The consecutive social policies of Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff have put an all-new focus on 
poverty alleviation. But with a growing middle class, Brazil needs to create a general safety 
net that will secure this new middle class some precaution to be sure they will not fall back in 
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poverty. Brazil is somewhat moving in the direction of a welfare society, though still a UK kind, 
which is a massive historical change. 
 
Furthermore, Brazil must accomplish to educate and train its growing middle class as 
backbone of further growth. As stated earlier it is essential to convert the massive consumer 
class into a producing one that supports labor demands and generates innovation. And when 
looking at Brazil as an emerging global power broker, this plays a significant role for the 
sustainability of Brazil as a competitiveness state.  
A skilled labor force is also crucial to stay in a leading position in energy technologies. Brazil 
has become a global player in the energy sector. The discovery of the Pré-Sal oil fields will 
make it one of world’s largest suppliers of petroleum in the near future and it already plays a 
crucial role in the production of bioethanol. Both will add up to Brazil’s exports and thus, 
provide further revenues, especially since oil becomes rare and bioethanol will become more 
popular as a substitute. All the while the revenues can serve as a source of financing of 
important investments in infrastructure, education and innovation. 
 
Overall, the growth period has strengthened the domestic foundation of Brazil’s economy. 
The demand of the new consumer class for instance buffered shocks of the global financial 
crisis and led to a quick recovery after a short recession in 2009. Thus, the growing middle 
class improves political and economic stability and makes the country less vulnerable to 
external shocks. However, the boom phase also revealed some severe bottlenecks of the 
country such as the lack of skilled labor and a deficient infrastructure. To address the issues 
that limit competitiveness and prevent the middle class from becoming a productive force of 
the economy is the major challenge for the coming governments. !  
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7. Changing Trade Patterns and the Danger of De-
industrialization 
Despite Cardozo’s liberalization Brazilian trade rather stagnated throughout his term until 
2002. This rather disappointing number can be explained by a number of crises, most 
severely the Brazilian financial crisis in 1999, of which several weakened world trade and the 
Brazilian economy. During the Lula’s era, Brazil’s trade ultimately started to expand strongly. 
Until 2010 the trade volume had almost quadrupled from US$ 110 billion to US$ 384 billion in 
2010 see graph 7.1). Especially until 2006 Brazil had an increasing trade surplus of up to 20 
percent of total trade. Many scholars make an increasing demand for resources and 
accelerating prices responsible for the increase of Brazil’s export and eventually for the 
growth period after 2003 (Bull & Kasahara 2011). While chapter five offers an alternative 
approach, stressing the importance of a growing middle class for Brazil’s boom phase, this 
chapter analyses Brazil’s trade relations, the growing trade ties to Asia and how this has 
affected Brazil’s manufacturing industry. 
 
Graph 7.1 Brazilian Trade, 1996 to 2010 
 
Source: BCB Annual Report 1997-2010 
 
7.1 Brazil’s Changing Trade Patterns 
To make an informed analysis how Brazil’s increasing trade and trade surplus has affected 
the country in a structural way it is first of all necessary to look into how Brazil’s trade 
relations developed in detail. For the period investigated three overarching trends become 
visible: (1) the traditionally largest trading partners United States and EU declined in the 
share of Brazil’s total trade; (2) Latin America and the Caribbean (hereafter only referred to 
as Latin America or LAC) preserved the same share but non-Mercosur countries became 
more important trading partners; (3) and Asia and most significantly China increased their 
share in trading with Brazil. 
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7.1.1 Decline of the West in the Brazil’s Trade 
Brazil once claimed to have a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, which was also 
visible in the trade relations between the two countries. As presented earlier United States 
became Brazil’s most important trading partner after the Second World War (Teixeira 2011) 
and remained an important ally during the military dictatorship and the Cardoso era. This 
however, changed under Lula who let FTAA negotiations fail when not seeing them beneficial 
for Brazil. Emir Sader argues that Lula pursued an active policy of looking for alternative 
trade partners for instance reviving Mercosur, turning to China and to African countries 
(Sader 2011). 
 
When looking at the share of different regions one observes that the United States indeed 
declined considerably in its share from 24 percent at the end of the Cardoso era to 12 
percent after 8 years of Lula in 2010 (see figure 7.2). In so far, Lula has very much 
succeeded in his policy goal to reduce dependence on the United States. The other 
traditional trading partner of Brazil, Europe, has also declined from 26 to 22 percent, but hold 
its share over Lula’s second term and remained stable during the financial crisis.  
 
Figure 7.2 Brazil’s trade share by region 
 
Source: BCB Annual Report 1997-2010 
 
Teixeira (2011) claims that the lost share of the United States since 1960 has shifted towards 
three major blocs: the European Union, Latin America, and Asia. While Europe rather gained 
from this decline before the Lula administration, there is a significant increase of Asia’s share, 
especially because China becomes the largest trading partner of Brazil. Furthermore, Latin 
America managed to surpass the European Union as destination for Brazilian exports and 
overtook the United States as origin of imports (see graph 7.3 and 7.4). Strikingly, only non-
Mercosur countries increased their total trade share between 1996 and 2008, while Mercosur 
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lost 30 percent of its share. The relevance of Latin America becomes particularly important 
when discussing manufacturing exports. 
 
Graph 7.3 Brazil’s export by region 
 
 
Graph 7.4 Brazil’s import by region 
 
Source: BCB Annual Report 1997-2010 
 
Another example of Brazil’s efforts to diversify its economic relations is the increased trade 
with Africa. Between 2001 and 2008 trade increased from a volume of US$3 billion to US$26 
billion. Even though Brazil is interested into diplomatic partnership with all African countries 
since they also form a big bloc in the UN, trade and investments are rather concentrated on a 
few countries and on resource extractive industries. However, cooperation expands to 
exchange about health and social policy and knowledge transfer in agricultural and 
renewable energy technology (Bodman et al. 2011:60-1). 
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Comparing the share distribution before and after Lula shows that Brazil successfully 
managed to lower its trade concentration on the United States and Europe from around 50 
percent in 2002 to 32 percent in 2010. This means structurally Brazil becomes less 
dependent on industrialized countries and in general diversifies its trade partners. 
Consequently, Brazil is less vulnerable as no country has influence over its economy 
(Teixeira 2011). However the total trade grew with almost 40 percent annually much faster 
than the GDP, which grew with about 4 percent (BCB Annual Report 2003-2010). Therefore, 
the Brazilian economy became eventually more influenced by global trade and thus, more 
intertwined with the growth cycles of the world economy. 
 
7.1.2 Regional Trade in LAC and Mercosur 
Brazil managed to decrease its North-South dependence and pursued an active South-South 
strategy under Lula. Within this strategy Latin America plays a central role. The significance 
of LAC becomes clear when looking into Brazil’s trade composition within the region. In 2010 
LAC alone accounted for 47 percent of Brazilian manufacturing exports, which makes it by far 
the most important destination for this important export sector3 (BCB 2010). Having such a 
high share of manufacturing goods in its exports Brazil’s strong position in LAC.  
 
However, Brazilian companies that gain influence in energy and agriculture markets 
throughout Latin America create concerns for Brazilian dominance. Petrobrás, for instance, is 
the biggest single taxpayer in Bolivia and makes substantial investments in Colombia. 
Furthermore, Bodman et al. (2011: 56) stresses the imbalance of trade between Brazil and its 
LAC partners. First, Brazil had a very high trade surplus of 55 percent in 2010 and second, 
80 percent of its exports are manufactured goods and only 17 percent raw materials, while 
only 27 percent of the imports are manufactured and 51 percent basic goods (BCB 2010). 
These numbers point towards a dependency relation, in which Brazil has the position of a 
center country, benefitting more from trade than its partners. Exporting manufactures offers 
Brazil higher gains from trade in the long run and thus, leads to unequal development of the 
region. Furthermore, the Brazilian market is rather closed, which again makes it difficult for 
trade partners to gain equally much from trade.  
 
According to Bodman et al. (2011: 56) Brazil has an “interest in reducing these imbalances” 
because it would profit from a strong common market in South America. It is already 
considered as the engine of regional growth and more balanced trade relations are needed to 
improve the infrastructure for shared production chains and to create regional stability. The 
Lula administration already promoted such cooperation, prioritizing Mercosur over the US 
lead FTAA and fostering UNASUR as forum for South American political and social 
cooperation beyond trade policies. Rousseff seeks to continue this path both ambitiously and 
carefully. Avoiding a “reputation of an exploitative hegemon” has a high priority in the strategy 
to “establish South America as Brazil’s strategic anchor for its global agenda” (Bodman et al. 
2011: 58).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 European Union 18.9 percent, United States 16.6 percent, Asia 7.2 percent (2010) 
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In order to do so Brazil might has to rethink its trade policies and foster lower trade barriers 
especially with Argentina, with which trade relations have been recently difficult (The 
Economist 2012c). Therefore, successfully calming worries about a dominant Brazil and 
striving for mutually beneficial trade agreements with Argentina and Mexico is central to the 
creation of a strong Latin American trade bloc, which can lobby for its interests on a global 
level as well. 
 
7.1.3 China’s Growing Dominance in Latin America 
The recent rise of China has an influence of both addressed trends. First, it potentially 
challenges the claim that Brazil managed to increase its independence on trading partners as 
it outpaced the United States as Brazil’s largest trading partner in 2009. Even though China’s 
share of 15 percent in 2010 is still far from US shares of 28 percent in 20024, Chinese 
resource demand contributed largely to Brazil’s trade surplus after 2003. Furthermore, trade 
between the two countries resembles a typical center-periphery relation, as Brazil mostly 
exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. 
Second, China as a major driving force of the world economy has arguably a big impact on 
the economic development of the LAC region and thus, might make a more coordinated 
approach to China necessary. 
 
To start with, it is important to understand China’s importance for the world economy. The 
country accounted alone for 28 percent of global GDP growth during the last decade. In 2009 
it became the world’s largest exporter. While world trade decreased in the same year, 
Chinese trade still recorded a growing in volume. Interestingly, it was the only important 
economy continuing to increase imports - also from Latin America. China demands especially 
raw materials that are exported by Latin America such as soy, copper, iron ore and oil. China 
consumes 40 percent of global metals and ores, some of Brazil’s major export goods 
(Rosales et al. 2012: 15-39).   
 
Bull &Kashahara (2011) points out that the growth period between 2003 and 2007 of Latin 
America was mainly driven by increasing demand for raw materials, of which the most 
important demander was the booming Chinese economy. Between 2000 and 2008 LAC 
exports to China rose annually by 34.6 percent and imports grew by 36.6 percent. However, 
trade with China is concentrated on a few South American countries, which are also the main 
beneficiaries from the trade relation: Brazil (41 percent), Chile (23.1 percent), Argentina (15.9 
percent) and Peru (9.3 percent). All other countries, particularly Central Americans, have a 
negative trade balance with China for the period from 2000 until 2009. This can be explained 
by competition in light industries and services between Central America and China, while the 
four beneficiaries mainly export raw materials to China and face an overall decrease of 
manufactured goods in their export baskets (Bull &Kashahara 2011).  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 During the Cold War the trade share of the United States was even higher. 
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This general trend is also very visible in Brazil’s trade. Between 2004 and 2008 exports 
increased sharply (see graph 7.5) and after 2006 primary exports increased even faster, 
which led to a decline of manufactures share. After 2006 manufacturing share declined 
steadily from about 55 to just 40 percent (see figure 7.6). In the same period primary goods 
increased from about 30 to 45 percent and overtook the share of manufactures in 2009. This 
trend has been strengthened by the global financial crisis that hit Brazil in 2009. Since 
Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities continued, the crisis hits manufactured goods 
much harder than primary goods, which finally became the biggest export sector 
(Christensen 2010).  
 
Graph 7.5 Brazil’s export composition, in US$ million 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Brazil’s export composition, in percent 
 
Source: BCB Annual Report 1997-2010 
 
Brazil as well as Latin America’s exports to China are very concentrated on few primary 
products. Only iron ore, soy and crude oil account for 73 percent of Brazilian exports to China. 
48 
Despite being the biggest supplier of these resources LAC did not manage to establish a 
significant bargaining relation, since China has also alternative supply (Rosales et al. 2012: 
96). Figure 7.7 demonstrates that the trade relation is very unbalanced in terms of 
manufacturing and commodity trade. The structure of this relation resembles a center-
periphery trade relation, in which Brazil has the role of the primary goods exporter and thus, 
in the long term will not benefit as much as China from trade. Concentration of trade on raw 
materials is considered to be disadvantageous because it shifts resources away from more 
knowledge-intensive industries, thus, harming innovation and productivity gains in industries. 
 
Figure 7.7 Brazil’s trade composition with China (in US$ billion)
 
Source: The Economist 2012a 
 
Beside the high demand for commodities, Chinese industrial strategy also actively 
undermines Brazil’s efforts to increase industrial production as China aims to pursue as many 
value-adding activities as possible in China (Jenkins 2010 in Bull &Kashahara 2011). 
Moreover, Chinese products become increasingly problematic for Brazilian goods. According 
to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI 2011 in Bull &Kashahara 2011) 45 percent of 
Brazilian companies that compete with Chinese products lost market share domestically and 
67 percent of Brazilian exporters lost share on the world market between 2006 and 2010. 
 
This Chinese competition especially on consumer goods is not limited to Brazil. As stated 
earlier most Latin American countries have trade deficits or at least imbalanced trade. 
Rosales and Kuwayama (2011: 99) recommend the LAC region to: 
 
“[exploit] the comparative advantages its natural resource endowments gives 
it in the Chinese market in a more efficient and coordinated way while at the 
same time trying to move up any value chains that may be created around 
manufactured products”. 
 
Adopting a coordinated approach bears many prospects for LAC countries, for instance 
adopting a region-wide ISI strategy, which aims to substitute imports from China with regional 
production. Brazil as the biggest economy of the region has probably the best position to 
initiate such an approach. At the same time, Brazil and many other countries can hardly 
afford a decrease in Chinese demand for their primary goods. However, this might happen 
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soon as Chinese growth could slow down and the decade of rapid growth in emerging 
economies is unlikely to continue. Ruchir Sharma (2012) argues that this rapid growth of 
China has driven the Brazilian boom and a slow down as well as falling prices will hit Brazil 
severely. In chapter eight this paper elaborates whether it shares this analysis or not. 
 
  
7.1.4 Overvalued currency: A Challenge for Brazilian Exports? 
 
An important factor that limits Brazilian competitiveness in manufactured goods is the high 
value of the real. Brazil’s problematic appreciation of the realduring the last years was caused 
by international developments and domestic reactions towards them. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, Brazil’s monetary policy’s major aim is to avoid high rates of inflation. 
Since Brazil has a relatively low threshold for inflationary pressures, the Central Bank of 
Brazil keeps one of the worlds highest interest rates of 7.25 percent (November, 2012), which 
is already a historical low rate (see appendix 12.4). A strong real towards the U.S. Dollar 
increased drastically the share of imports in domestic consumption from 13 percent in 2008 
to 20 percent in 2010 (Landim 2010 in Gouvea 2012). Meanwhile, an appreciating real not 
only penalizes Brazilian manufactures in domestic but of course also in export markets. 
 
While counter-inflationary monetary policy, such as maintaining high interest rates, is 
reasonable when being prone to easily uncontrollable inflation rate, the main reasons for the 
appreciating real are external factors. First, increasing demand for Brazil’s major commodities 
such as iron ore and soy, especially from China, boosted Brazil’s exports as well as world 
prices. Accordingly, Brazil has accomplished a trade surplus, which leads to an inflow of 
foreign currency and thus, to currency appreciation. Graph 7.8 demonstrates that the 
appreciation of the real during Lula’s term was very much correlated with increasing exports 
and a period of high trade surplus between 2003 and 2009, reaching its strongest values in 
the end of 2008 and 2011. Furthermore, high interest rates lead to an inflow of capital into 
Brazil’s financial markets; an economic growth making Brazil interesting for foreign direct 
investments (FDI). These three factors contributed to an appreciating and now overvalued 
real during the Lula administration. 
 
Graph 7.8 Spot exchange rate, US$ in Brazilian Real  
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com (2012) 
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Even if those factors are of external nature, Paolo Kliass (2011:22) claims, “Little has been 
done to counteract currency appreciation”. Lula’s administration followed mainly the monetary 
policy of the predecessor Cardoso’s Plano Real, which entails (1) combatting inflation, (2) a 
free-floating exchange rate regime and (3) aimed for budget surplus. Kliass (2011) admits 
that Brazil has to walk a narrow path when trying to keep inflation and appreciation in check 
at the same time. Nonetheless, he blames Lula for one-sided promotion of budget surpluses 
without considering the problems that this would bring to Brazilian industries. 
 
Brazilian officials however, already approached this matter, accusing the United States and 
China for undervaluing their currencies and damaging Brazilian economy through a further 
appreciating real. Two years ago, Brazil already undertook drastic measures to counter 
appreciation with the imposition of a tax on capital inflows, which has been removed after the 
real deflated again. Now the Economist Intelligence Unit (2012) expects the Rousseff 
government to be ready for more expansionist practices, reducing the interest rate and 
gradually moving away from the inflation-targeting policies of Cardoso and Lula. As visible in 
graph 7.8 the real depreciated in 2012. This can be partly explained by interest rate cuts 
during the year (see appendix 11.3) as well as a slowdown of growth close to stagnation 
during the first three quarters of 2012, which further depreciated the currency (see appendix 
11.2).  
 
To conclude, the current government seems to be more concerned about Brazil’s declining 
share of manufactures and pursues a more radical monetary policy that “forgoes revenues in 
exchange for a reduction in overall production cost” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012: 4). 
However, it remains to be seen whether the new confidence of the Central Bank that inflation 
can be more loosely controlled is a correct assumption and does not lead to inflationary 
pressures. 
 
7.2 The Political Economy of Trade 
After analyzing the changing structures of Brazilian trade and other external trends such as 
appreciating pressures on the real, this section addresses the evolving problem of declining 
manufacturing exports. Increasing imports of the latter points towards a low competitiveness 
of Brazil in this sector, but previous analysis on Brazil’s political model suggests that it does 
not confront this problem with exposing its industry to global competition since it would most 
likely disrupt its social agenda. Thus, this section analyses how Brazil addresses this problem 
by industrial and trade policies. 
 
7.2.1 Asian competition for Brazil’s Manufacturing Industry 
Brazil’s manufacturing industry can be regarded as of structural importance for the country’s 
economy. Brazil’s industrial minister Fernando Pimentel stresses that for instance car-
manufacturing influences many other sectors such as insurances, electricity or energy. Thus, 
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an industrial base plays a fundamental role for the development of a country to a middle-
income or even developed country. The Prebisch-Singer model also suggests that 
developing countries have to produce industrial goods to overcome their disadvantageous 
trade relations with center countries. Pimentel leaves no doubt that Brazil regards its 
manufacturing sector as vital for its development strategy when stating: “Developed countries 
are those that have industry and we're going to protect our own” (quoted in The Economist 
2012c). 
 
This statement refers to recent increasing pressures on Brazil’s car industry particularly from 
Chinese companies, which are blamed to pursue “predatory competition” (ibid). In fact, Asian 
importers became not only lately competitors for Brazil’s manufacturers (Financial Times 
2012b, The Economist 2012a). The South Korean company Kia, for instance gained 32 
percent market share since it entered the market 20 years ago. However, Brazilian car 
manufacturers were confronted by a 30 percent increase of imported cars in 2011 and car 
imports from China even grew ten times (The Economist 2012c). 
 
Several factors are responsible why Brazil seems to lose ground in an industry that it has 
nurtured carefully with business and trade policies. First of all, Asia became very competitive 
in almost every sector of manufacturing industry. Figure 7.9 demonstrates how Asia 
increased its share of developing countries’ manufacturing production from 50 percent in 
1990 to 70 percent in 2006. China’s share almost doubled and overtook the one of Latin 
America already by 2000. The share of Latin America meanwhile significantly declined from 
36 percent to 20 percent (Rosales et al. 2012:49). These numbers suggest that LAC 
competitiveness could not hold pace with Asian productivity gains. China has especially 
gained global market share in sectors that are vital for Brazilian industries. In both, high-
technology goods, such as airplanes and computers, and the medium-high-technology sector, 
such as cars, sector China enlarged its share of world exports dramatically (Rosales et al. 
2012:46-48).  
 
Figure 7.9 Developing regions: Share of total developing-country manufacturing value added, 
1990-2006 
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Source: Rosales et al. 2012: 49 
 
While Asia and especially China are becoming more competitive in the manufacturing sector, 
Brazil faces a lot of obstacles with improving its productivity. The so-called ‘Brazil cost’ 
incorporates several aspects, as a deficient infrastructure, high interest rates and taxes, and 
deficient infrastructure makes doing business in the country expensive” (The Economist 
2012b). Moreover, the appreciating real makes exports expensive and gives importers further 
price advantages. Finally, wages are relatively high, there is a lack of skilled labor, and 
lengthy bureaucracy put further costs on producers (Financial Times 2012b). Thus, the ‘Brazil 
cost’ gives strong advantages to importers and reduces the attractiveness to produce in 
Brazil or to start a business. 
 
7.2.2 The Role of Protectionism in Brazil’s Industrial Strategy 
”The Brazil cost” is evidently not a recent problem for Brazil, but has been a menace to the 
country even before the import liberalization of the early 1990’ies. The Brazil cost, which to a 
large extent is synonymous with the low level of competitiveness that continuously plague 
Brazil in different areas. 
As described in chapter 4, Brazil was characterized by a period of “industrialization by 
invitation” until the import liberalization, followed by hyperinflation. During this time, Brazil not 
only liberalized its import restrictions but also lowered tariff barriers from 57.5 to 17 percent 
from 1987 to 1993 (Brainard, Martinez-Diaz 2009: 117). After the introduction of Plano Real, 
a huge part of Brazilian manufacturing markets was increasingly challenged due to the fact 
that they now were not only facing increasing foreign competition but also a new strong 
currency. Due to an increasingly grim-looking trade deficit, Brazilian politicians reintroduced 
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higher tariff levels the following years as well as established several market monopolies and 
oligopolies on the manufacturing market as a way to reestablish Brazilian-based market 
share (ibid.: 118). 
Particularly manufacturing sectors, such as automobiles, electronics, textiles and clothing, 
which were, and still are, deemed important to the fact that Brazil has received heavy 
protection against foreign competitors. 
Ignoring the short period of lower tariff levels and import liberalization - which introduced a 
new liberal époque for the country, the new Brazil has largely been characterized by 
protectionist measures (ibid.: 118). 
 
While the “protectionism label” often has a negative connotation, particularly in the current 
global age, applying this label to the new Brazil is more complex than seen at first glance. It is 
hard to counter-argue that Brazilian manufacturing was challenged by the introduction of a 
stable currency, while still having to adapt liberal market conditions. If one takes into account 
that Mexico suffered from some of the similar aspects of economic change during the 
establishment of NAFTA at the same time as Plano Real was established, one sees that 
major parts of Mexican manufacturing industry crumbled when exposed to strong market 
regulation with the result of hundreds of thousands lost jobs with severe consequences for 
Mexico (The Economist 2012c). Taking this into account, one can imagine that Brazilian 
policy makers were concerned of similar things happening to Brazil, if the exposition of 
manufacturing continued during this period. But the creation of tariffs and reintroduction of 
protectionist policies does not universally describe Brazil’s domestic market and tariff strategy. 
 
In many ways, Brazilian markets have since the import liberalization established two different 
market strategies; one for production of raw materials and one for production of 
manufacturing goods. The raw material producers have to a large extent maintained an 
offensive market strategy until today, while the manufactured goods producers have 
maintained a highly defensive strategy (Brainard, Martinez-Diaz 2009: 133). This implies that 
producers of raw materials, particularly the agricultural and mining industry, not only has 
been highly competitive but also has strived to gain access to new foreign markets. 
Meanwhile manufacturing producers are doing the exact opposite; seeking to protect 
domestic markets from foreign interference and rarely expand without state intervention. 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that these market sectors have spill-over effects on 
Brazilian political institutions. This is for instance seen in how the raw material producers has 
huge influence and political backup in the Ministry of Agriculture and how the manufacturing 
sector enjoys the same benefits from the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (ibid.).  
Several scholars such as Brainard and Martinez Diaz are arguing that Brazilian foreign trade 
politics to a large extent are characterized by two main trends; first, to value risk minimizing 
for domestic markets over mainstream government inclination5 and second, that Brazilian 
policy makers prioritize to support the manufacturing sector over raw material (ibid.: 115-116, 
133).  Here it is important to note that the manufacturing sector has a political advantage by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5Such as striving for security and influence. 
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having the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since this ministry has huge influence on 
the outcome of trade barriers and tariff levels. The two tendencies has throughout the new 
era of Brazil resulted in a manner of special tailored tariff barriers and political restrictions on 
Brazilian markets for manufactured goods in order to uphold market share and support the 
industry. It can therefore be argued that Brazil has reapplied a quasi ISI strategy to the 
manufacturing market since the import liberalization (ibid.: 115). 
 
This ISI approach differs to some extent. Brazil has managed to develop huge parts of 
manufacturing sector to industrial standards throughout their previous appliance of ISI 
strategies. Therefore, it can be questioned if appliance of the ISI strategy seen after the 
import liberalization is serving the intention to evolve Brazil’s manufacturing industry or if it 
serves other interests. In general measures that protect industrial production, jobs and 
innovation in Brazil, fit towards the choice of following a social agenda with emphasis on 
welfare provisions. ISI strategies support this choice with protecting industries and jobs 
against competition through cheap labor and low social standards elsewhere. However some 
observers criticize that protectionism mainly serves elite interests without providing benefits 
for the whole economy (ibid.: 142). While the interrelation of elites in industry and politics 
hints towards a certain relevance of this claim the paper rather regards ISI strategies as of 
structural effect on the economy, since the impact of elites benefits is difficult to estimate. 
 
The post import liberalization ISI strategies are also differentiating themselves by not only 
being a response to maintain the manufacturing sector and its market share, but also a 
strategy to keep the Brazilian manufacturing markets alive in a world of continuous currency 
struggles, as also stressed in the previous section. Thus, Brazil also uses the high tariff level 
to make up for the disadvantage of the strong real for the manufacturing sector. The problem 
with this is that tariff barriers are only maintaining the large market share domestically, and 
therefore, do not help Brazilian manufacturers to obtain greater market share on the global 
scale. In order to obtain this, Brazilian policy makers need to either lower the currency 
dramatically, risking an alarming inflation rate, improve competitiveness, which is a long and 
tough process, or establish stronger trade agreements to potential trade partners, both 
regional and global. 
 
7.2.3 Case Study: Trade Barriers to Foster Innovation 
Yet, ISI strategies seem to have the effect that Brazil’s carmakers concentrate mainly on the 
huge domestic market, however, they also face competitors that are used to free access to 
the Brazilian market. Brazil’s regional peer Mexico, with whom it has a free trade agreement 
on cars, becomes more and more competitive, compared to Brazil in this industrial sector. In 
2011 Mexican car exports to Brazil increased by 40 percent leaving Brazilian exporters far 
behind (The Economist 2012c). The reason for this evolving competitiveness gap lies in the 
different export orientations of the economies. While Mexico exposed its industries to free 
trade with North America it gained productivity and created an export-oriented industry that 
now produces for the whole Americas. Meanwhile Brazil followed a protectionist path, 
shielding its industries from global competition. An appreciating real punished the productivity 
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lack even more and led now to a dramatic increase of imports. Consequently, Brazilian 
manufacturing share of GDP dropped from 17.2 percent in 2000 to 14.6 percent in 2011 (ibid). 
 
According to Bodman et al. (2011:16) the current trend of increasing focus on commodities, 
while losing competitiveness in manufacturing further distorts Brazil’s incentives to be 
innovative. The Rousseff government has approached this problem and initiated programs to 
promote research and development (R&D) in the car industry. The “Inovar-Auto” program 
incorporates regulations that require carmakers to invest certain percentages of revenues 
into local research and to conduct a certain amount of production stages in Brazil, Mercosur 
or Mexico in order to get released from heavy IPI tax burdens6 of up to 55 percent. According 
to government officials, the program is not a protectionist measure, but rather aims on 
stimulating the economy and balancing the lack of competitiveness that Brazilian carmakers 
face (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012; Financial Times 2012a). 
 
While protectionism is only discussed in the following chapter, the complaints of car importers 
are reasonable. It is difficult to understand how imposing a quota of just 4.800 cars and a 30 
percent IPI increase on the already existing 35 percent tariff is not protectionist7. Moreover, 
announcement on short notice penetrates the business plan of companies as Kia and Suzuki 
severely. Since the import restrictions of Inovar-Auto do apply for all importers outside 
Mercosur or Mexico the reasoning that it is directed against unfair practices of other 
economies is very questionable. Therefore, the Brazilian strategy can be accused of being 
protectionist and not only offsetting. Nonetheless, it sets incentives to make much needed 
investments into R&D and promote technology transfer since it makes production in Brazil 
more attractive for companies that also want to sell in Brazil. Furthermore, Inovar-Auto 
includes several tax benefits for instance on payroll taxes that release those who comply from 
tax burdens and make Brazilian producers more competitive. 
 
Even though, programs for special industries might improve the competitiveness of those 
producers on the domestic as well as on the global market, Brazil has to address the 
underlying structural problems that lead to the “Brazil cost”. Infrastructure investments are 
already on top of the agenda of the Rousseff administration and there are plans to increase 
spending on education to the OECD target level of 7 percent of GDP until 2020 (Bodman et 
al. 2011:25). Thus, the Rousseff government seems to prioritize improvement of 
competitiveness, which is necessary after Lula focused on improving living standards, social 
cohesion and the purchasing power of the growing middle class. Nonetheless, previous 
efforts to improve infrastructure and education were of limited success and the lethargic and 
huge bureaucratic apparatus not only harms businesses but also modernization efforts of the 
government itself (Gouvea 2012). As has been mentioned before external factors such as 
Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities and its strength in manufacturing production have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Industrial Product Tax (IPI) is added on manufacturing products, which do not fulfill local content 
requirements, so it works basically like a tariff. 
7 The 35 percent tariff on cars is already the maximum barrier allowed by the WTO (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2012) 
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a huge impact on Brazilian efforts to diversify its economy and to make it more knowledge 
intensive. 
 
7.3 Summing up: Threat of De-industrialization? 
Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff follows a more ambitious competitiveness agenda than her 
predecessor Lula. This effort becomes visible in recent interventionist policies such as Inovar-
Auto. Such approaches can be traced back to the ISI strategy of Latin American structuralists 
freeing LAC countries from industrial imports from developed countries such as the United 
States or Europe. 
 
Despite increased efforts of strengthening or at least preserving the industrial base, the 
analysis shows that Brazil is being much more successful in areas where it has naturally a 
competitive advantage to other big economies. Over the last decade the country could take 
advantage from its abundance of resources such as soy, iron ore and crude oil, which were 
the most demanded exports by its new biggest trading partner, China. Booming exports of 
these products granted Brazil considerable trade surpluses. In so far Brazil is one of the 
greatest beneficiaries from trade with China. It could uphold trade surpluses, which bolstered 
foreign reserves and helped to decrease foreign debt. Furthermore, trade revenues give the 
government significant room for maneuvers in their budget spending and thus, the chance to 
make significant investments to improve competitiveness. 
 
However, it also adds to the risk of de-industrialization because countries with huge 
commodity exports are discouraged of industrial production due to higher rewards in resource 
extractive sectors and appreciating currencies making industrial products less competitive. 
Unfortunately, decreasing share of manufacturing industries in the GDP as well as in exports 
support the latter claim. Manufacturing is not only eaten up by rising raw material exports, but 
also substituted by imports on the domestic market. This twofold trend undermines Brazil’s 
strategy to maintain a relatively closed economy that pushes producers to built factories 
within the country. ISI strategies are part of Brazil’s approach to control the market and 
promote industries of national interest. Recently the government initiated steps to further 
follow this path and try to counter import inflows by even higher trade barriers on the one 
hand and on the other hand long needed tax cuts and incentives for innovation. 
 
Despite tough competition from Asia and Mexico, Brazil managed to reduce its overall 
dependency on single trade partners. Particularly its North-South relations are not as 
concentrated as they were 10 or 15 years ago. Consequently, Lula’s South-South agenda of 
strengthening the regional ties and opening new ties to Africa and other emerging economies 
successfully diversified Brazil’s trade partners. Nonetheless, especially trade in Mercosur did 
not increase its share, which shows that the trade union still suffers from political 
unwillingness to lift protectionism, especially between Brazil and Argentina. Nonetheless, 
aiming for making Mercosur and Unasur successful cooperation schemes between South 
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American nations appears as Brazil’s best chance to create a market, which drives its 
industrial production, and improves competitiveness at the same time. 
#  
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8. Discussing Brazil on the Global Stage 
Investigating in the field of Global Political Economy, this discussion will bring together 
politics and economics on the domestic as well as the global level. Drawing from the main 
points of the analyses, we have in front of us many different topics ranging from the local to 
global level, which we have to combine. To do this in a meaningful way the discussion is split 
into the following two parts: 
 
A A Brazilian political economic model, promoting its global standing 
B Brazil’s role in a changing world trade and the risk of dependency on China  
 
The first part encapsulates the idea that Brazil has created a policy strategy of promoting 
internal development and its global standing. The causation is therefore National → Global. 
Here the state-market discussion will be engaged on an international level, introducing terms 
such as the logistical state and the competition state to fully enable a discussion of Brazil in 
the international system. Structuralist and neoliberal views will be put into play at this point. 
 
The second part encapsulates the idea that recent developments in the world trade affects 
Brazil and its role on the global stage. Thus, the causation here is Global → National. 
Bringing in the historical developments and international structural changes enables the 
discussion of Brazil’s dependency relation with center countries as well as its 
interdependence with the world economy. 
 
8.1: A Brazilian Political Economic Model, Promoting its Global 
Standing 
After "a lost decade" of economic instability, debt, and inflation, the "new presidents" 
introduced and consistently followed a set of policies that successfully addressed these 
problems. By doing this while simultaneously setting a new social agenda, where the poorest 
were increasingly included into society, Brazil achieved significant macroeconomic stability as 
well as created a new social model. 
 
First, Cardoso introduced an “orthodox” macroeconomic model aiming on inflation control and 
cuts on public spending and simultaneously planted the seed for social change. Secondly, 
Lula shaped the country with his deepening of the social agenda and the promotion of the 
national economy on the global level. Thirdly, Rousseff encountered the lack of 
competitiveness in different sectors. 
 
8.1.1 Consumer Class Sustainability 
The new model of Brazil is particular based on a strong consumer class, which upholds a 
strong domestic market. It was especially a central policy for Lula to create this fundament. 
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However, his success is controversially debated. Sharma (2012: 87) for instance argues 
“much of Brazil’s consumer boom has been driven by income from commodity sales [and] 
that the domestic market will not provide much of a cushion in the event of such a slowdown.” 
Opposed to this, we argue that political and economic stability were substantial reasons why 
Brazil was able to profit from its market size, and ambitious welfare programs created a 
consumer class that provides a huge growth potential. The consumer class also became the 
backbone of domestic industries such as car manufacturing, which mostly produce consumer 
goods for the domestic market. Furthermore, there should be a huge potential for Brazilian as 
well as international investors in a socio-economic upward move of millions of Brazilians. The 
continuing implementation of welfare programs will most probably strengthen this trend and 
increase consumerism, which will intensify competition in the domestic economy, promoting 
competitiveness and innovation. 
Subsequently, the Brazilian economy is much more backed by domestic stabilizers in times 
of global economic turmoil, than critical voices believe. 
 
8.1.2 Today’s Protectionism and ISI 
ISI strategies have been widely used in Brazil to pursue a path towards less dependency 
from the West. Today Brazil has been an industrialized country for many years, at least when 
not counting the country’s many rural areas, which still are facing basic problem. 
The ISI strategy have been criticized by some for its lack of renewal and adaptability, while 
others argue that the political idea of the ISI policies have survived and evolved into the 
current protectionism of the domestic markets, which are threatened by foreign competition. 
In order to secure the domestic market, Brazil has protectionist business policies, subsidized 
industries, and tariff barriers on imports, which could become a problem for Brazil’s 
competitiveness in the future. On the other hand Brazil has been able to protect a lot of its 
own industries from being outmatched by efficiency-driven economies with low production 
costs. 
Through state intervention Brazil aims at ensuring public interests in the economy without 
dominating or managing the private sector. This is especially seen in the promotion and 
protection of industries that are regarded of national interest. Examples of state intervention 
are for instance the promotion of national champions such as Petrobrás or Embrea, and the 
interventionist industrial policies such as Inovar-Auto, which promotes domestic production 
and innovation while keeping out imports. 
By intertwining market and state, Brazil ensures to not lose control over transnational 
corporations in the market, and state-owned enterprises provide revenues for the state. Brazil 
should be careful though, that their protectionist strategy does not backfire, as they become 
less attractive for foreign investments, which could harm the competition and result in a less 
diverse business environment. 
 
8.1.3 State Intervention 
The Brazilian model is based on state intervention in markets and welfare promotion, this 
contradicts with the liberal approach to globalization, opening to global market forces and 
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thus gaining competitiveness, which is termed “competition state”. As exemplified many times 
in this project, Brazil does not follow such an approach; instead Brazil is a rare example of a 
state that pursues a policy agenda of an industrial welfare state, marked by state intervention 
to improve competitiveness and an expanding distributive social program, including cash 
grants and minimum wages. This is first of all in the interest of the Brazilian population that 
showed strong support for Lula’s social agenda and second reflected in the interest of elites, 
whose major foreign policy concern has traditionally been to protect vulnerable Brazilian 
industries against foreign competition. 
 
Discussing dependency in relation to the Brazilian model gives an interesting view on state-
market relations on the global level. Brazil uses its market as an agent for its global and 
regional agenda. Its market size and strength ensures recognition on international level and 
prevents dependency relations because it is managed in a way that does not allow 
tremendous foreign power formation in the Brazilian market. The Brazilian model, or a 
‘logistical state’, as coined by Amado Cervo, pursues substantial public policies to promote 
national interests and “mimics the behavior of the advanced nations” in external relations 
(Bernal-Meza 2010:197). The major aim in this strategy is the closing of the technology and 
innovation gap and the reduction of external vulnerabilities of the domestic economy. In 
pursuing this development from an efficiency-driven state to an innovation-driven one, or from 
a semi-periphery country to a center country, Brazil actively uses its market power in national 
interest. Subsequently, the country has a coordinated business and political agenda on the 
global level. For instance the creation of national champions under Lula, which are able to 
compete at the world market, are strong agents promoting Brazil’s interests abroad. 
Furthermore, the state can promote its interest in foreign markets through investments and 
integration of its markets into global production chains (Cervo 2008 in ibid.). This is often 
visible in industrial policies promoting innovation, but also protecting the economy from import 
competition as for instance Inovar-Auto. 
To sum up, the Brazilian economic model serves the interest of reducing dependency and 
economic vulnerability through market intervention and social protection. It combines features 
of an industrial welfare state with new protectionist responses to globalization. 
 
8.2. Brazil’s Role in a Changing World Trade and the Risk of 
Dependency on China 
Our historical analysis shows, that Brazil experienced several times typical center-periphery 
trade relations with more advanced economies for instance with Portugal and Imperial United 
Kingdom. In trade relations with the United States the periphery position of Brazil was less 
clear because Brazil already industrialized in the 1930s. However, one can still speak of an 
dependency situation since the United States were Brazil’s largest trading partner until 2009 
with great dominance from the 40s until the 60s, while Brazil never managed to become 
equally important for the United States and subsequently is more vulnerable to US economic 
policy than the other way around.  
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Nonetheless, dependency relations of Brazil underwent important structural changes over the 
last 15 years. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new economic and political 
players, as well as accelerating economic globalization, Brazil was able to readjust its 
position in global politics and trade. This took mostly place during Lula’s era, which was 
marked by reduction of trade share to advanced economies, promotion of regional 
cooperation, strengthening of South-South relations and the emergence of China as Brazil’s 
most important trading partner. Lula was criticized from many Western economic observers 
to have missed an opportunity to open the economy and overcoming lacks of 
competitiveness when ending FTAA negotiations. However, prioritizing Mercosur and global 
South-South relations is eventually an approach, which is part of Brazil’s political and 
economic model of combining development strategy with its international agenda. Instead of 
becoming a junior trading partner of the United States, Brazil’s ambition is the promotion of 
the global South as independent actor with a significantly different agenda than the 
established powers, economically as well as politically. Promoting itself as a leading actor of 
its region as well as of the global South is in accordance with Brazil’s policy preferences such 
as self-determination, promotion of the market as agent of the state and readjustment of 
international organizations according to shifting global realities. Consequently, Brazil’s South-
South strategy is more appropriate for Brazil’s policy choice to not become a competition 
state and offers a development strategy for other countries to follow, promoting democracy 
and a strong redistributive state. 
 
8.2.1 Risk of dependency on China 
Part of the South-South strategy is a close partnership with China in which Brazil has 
benefited from a booming trade. But even though Brazil upholds a trade surplus in its 
extensive trade of commodities, the trade composition is a cause of concern. Almost only 
exporting raw materials and importing mostly manufactures resembles a periphery position of 
Brazil, which potentially harms Brazil’s industrial strategy that aims for a strong and 
competitive industrial base of the country. An inflow of Chinese imports is seen as serious 
threat for Brazilian production. Nonetheless, it is not particularly Chinese imports that create 
the problem, even though they are most targeted by Brazilian anti-dumping measures. In 
general Brazil faces a problematic increase of imports over the last year and simultaneously 
a shrinking of the manufacturing share of GDP for almost a decade. 
 
While Brazil’s competitiveness in the manufacturing sector is rather limited, it has its 
comparative advantage in raw materials. Over the last decade metals and agricultural goods 
experienced record high prices and demand, which boosted Brazil’s exports. In that way 
Brazil is rather well prepared for a century of resource scarcity. Besides industrial base 
materials and agricultural goods, Brazil will play an important role in the energy market of the 
future, becoming a leading supplier of biofuel and petroleum. Comparative advantage in 
these areas will secure Brazil export revenues as well as a strong negotiation position in 
international institutions. Currently revenues from their major export goods are in decline due 
to a slowdown of the world economy and decreasing prices and it provides Brazil with 
difficulties because it contributes to a stagnating economy. However, energy and foodstuff 
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will experience strong demand in the future due to an increasing world population and a 
growing global middle class. 
 
The current slowdown however, seem to support Sharma’s (2012) argument that the 
Brazilian economy would stagnate as soon as resource demand from China declines. 
Although this paper disagrees with the one sided analysis of China driving the Brazilian 
economy, since it disregards tremendous changes in the domestic economy as well as 
relations to the rest of the world there is a certain dependency relation with China. China 
became Brazil's biggest trading partner in 2009, the year in which Brazil was hit by the global 
financial crisis and world trade shrank. With still increasing imports from Brazil, while world 
trade was shaken heavily, China buffered Brazil’s economy against external shocks. 
Therefore, China gains an importance for Brazil’s trade that does not exist the other way 
around, which means that there is a dependency relation that gets stronger. 
 
8.2.2 Competitiveness 
Chinese demand for raw materials and the high competitiveness in Asian industrial 
production catalyze an underlying problem, which that Brazil faces a competitiveness 
problem rather than a trade problem. 
 
Mexico along with most Asian countries produce cheaper goods because lower production 
costs effectively counters Brazil’s competitiveness. In that sense, one could argue that the 
Brazilian development strategy is confronted with a paradox; it wants to become a developed 
country in terms of welfare and innovation standards, but is competing with less developed 
countries, which have lower welfare aspirations. Competition with efficiency driven 
economies such as China could pressure social standards to the bottom, while Brazil strive to 
become innovation driven in order to afford higher living standards. 
A major obstacle towards reaching higher levels of innovation and to strengthen technology 
intensive production is the lack of skilled labor. After the middle class significantly increased 
and reached higher living standards, it has to become a more productive and innovative 
factor in the Brazilian economy - one could say that Brazil has to turn its consumers into 
producers. Successfully addressing competitiveness factors such as infrastructure, education 
and training and the lowering of tax and bureaucratic burdens is the key challenge for Brazil 
to gain competitiveness while simultaneously upholding its welfare aspirations. 
 
Sharma argues that Brazil should cut down on public spending, in particular welfare spending, 
and open up its economy in order to address the lack of competitiveness. This view however, 
does not count in the importance of the consumer class as backbone of the Brazilian 
economy in times of crises, the stabilizing effect of poverty alleviation, and higher living 
standards leading to more participation within the economy and the civil society. 
 
 
 
63 
8.2.3 Regional Cooperation 
Increasingly unbalanced trade with China is an issue for most other Latin American countries. 
A look into regional organizations and trade agreements explains why the region can hardly 
find a coordinated approach to their common concerns. Heavy trade barriers between 
Argentina and Brazil and in general low levels of intra-regional trade and weak free trade 
agreements as Mercosur prevent the region currently to become a more recognized and 
integrated trade bloc. It lacks the infrastructure for being integrated into global production 
chains and intra-industry trade is rather small at the regional level as well as at the global 
level. 
 
Adopting a regional approach to the China challenge, but also to address bottlenecks to 
competitiveness more generally appears as a reasonable strategy because it enlarges the 
market without dismissing the Brazilian model. A high share of technology intensive imports 
are problematic for most South American countries and therefore, a regional ISI strategy 
could foster a situation where to get less dependent on such imports. The best example for 
such an approach is the European Union with a common external tariff and free trade within 
the organization. South American countries could similarly strive for increasing intra-industry 
trade patterns within the region and building up production chains. The benefit from such an 
approach is a certain protection against more competitive non-regional trading partners such 
as China - and Mexico when only speaking of South America. There is however, the risk of a 
too dominant Brazil, because it has an almost equally unbalanced trade relation with the 
region as it has with China, only this time with Brazil in the center position. Dominance 
combined with the absence of social standards could lead to a race to the bottom, benefitting 
a few powerful states, while pushing weaker states in even greater dependency. 
 
To sum up, regional cooperation appears as a prospect and a challenge at the same time. It 
is a challenge since its current insufficiency is one reason why Brazil cannot gain sufficient 
competitiveness through regional competition, additionally an attempt would bring along risks, 
not only for Brazil. However, cooperation appears as the most promising prospect in 
addressing Brazil’s competitiveness problems in the long term. In comparison to other 
regions of the world South America is lacking behind in terms of trading with each other. A 
stronger intra-regional trade brings reciprocal benefits, since it fosters regional stability and 
strengthens the regional interests at the global level as well as it could add to each country’s 
economy. As an emerging power, Brazil is in need for a regional anchor of strong, 
cooperative partners to promote its economic and political agenda. !  
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9. Conclusions 
Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff can altogether be coined as the “new presidents” of Brazil, since 
their consecutive policies provided newfound stability and strength in both the domestic and 
international political economy of Brazil. The innovation in their ways to structurally change 
Brazil has created a new social model, which provides a social safety net, includes more 
people in the economy, and promotes Brazil on the global stage. 
 
By alleviating poverty and stabilizing the economy an increase of the middle class generated 
consumption as well as government revenues making further investments in both public and 
private sector possible. Further implementation of welfare programs will most probably 
strengthen this trend and increase consumerism, which will intensify competition in the 
domestic economy, promoting competitiveness and innovation. There is much discussion 
about the sustainability of the consumer class in times of crises or falling demand of primary 
goods. It is difficult to conclude on this, but it is nonetheless sure that the lack of education in 
the middle class can pose a serious problem for Brazil in the future. Overall though, the 
increased social agenda provides the backbone of the new Brazilian model and thus is of 
utmost importance to continue in the future. 
 
The growing consumer class and the development of the domestic market by state-led 
programs provides security for domestic production and makes Brazil less dependent from 
trade with other countries. This combined with the energy self-efficiency and the decrease in 
trade with Europe and the US, means that Brazil is developing from its current semi-periphery 
position towards a center position, especially in a regional context. 
Despite the consumer class demand, the Brazilian manufacturing industry is currently facing 
tremendous challenges since its share of trade and GDP has decreased in recent years. To 
solve this problem, education and training of skilled workers is necessary as well as an 
increase in technological level, better infrastructure, lower taxation, and a less complex 
bureaucracy. These challenges, commonly known as the “Brazil cost”, are being addressed 
by the current Rousseff government but will most certainly continue to be challenges for 
many years to come. 
 
The quadrupling of Brazil’s trade volume in 2002-10, has, combined with the described 
domestic developments, significantly paved the way for Brazil to become a prominent political 
and economic global power. In the same period the tendency of diversification in Brazil’s 
trade partners continued, effectively making Brazil less dependent on Western countries and 
to a some extent increasingly dependent of China. This new dependency roots in an 
unbalanced trade relation, where Brazil mostly exports primary goods and imports 
manufactures, becomes an increasingly worrying factor. Still, this pattern has played a 
positive role for the Brazilian economy so far, especially in the light of the financial crisis 
where the trade with China continued. 
 
Brazil must find a middle way in their protectionist policies, so that domestic industries are 
protected from foreign competition, while a reduction or removal of less vital trade barriers 
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must take place in order to improve the lack in competitiveness. This should nonetheless 
happen without lowering of social standards. This task could in time be combined in a wider 
regional strategy with other South American countries, in which a common protectionist policy 
could secure a stable economy as well as solidify Brazil as the regional leader in accordance 
to it’s current regional agenda. 
 
Overall Brazil has a competitiveness problem and a trade problem, but can overcome both by 
deepening competitiveness, improving the education system, and further promoting regional 
cooperation. In conclusion, one can say that despite the many current challenges Brazil faces, 
it has never been in a better social-political-economic position when applying a historical view. 
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10. Perspectivation 
This paper has analyzed Brazil’s role in global politics with a strong focus on trade. By this it 
is able to provide a profound account on the macroeconomic situation of the country. The 
structuralist approach however, has its limitations when it comes to an analysis of power in 
international relations. Such an analysis is necessary to make an informed discussion of 
Brazil’s evolving position in global politics. 
Issues of striking importance are for instance, behavior in international institutions, as Brazil 
expressed the country’s wish to adapt the international system to new global realities, while 
today’s system is still dominated by Western powers. First steps to such an approach are 
visible in the creation of IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) marking the beginning of 
stronger cooperation among emerging economies of the Global South. It remains to be seen 
whether these countries can first, become acknowledged representatives of their region; 
second, strengthen their position in established institutions as the UN Security Council and 
third, create a counterbalance to established powers and China, which is interestingly 
excluded from this cooperation. 
On the regional level, the political reality for Brazil does not look very promising. There are 
rarely signs that Mercosur or UNASUR could soon become a true integration project as the 
European Union. Despite the fact, that South America lacks behind in terms of inter regional 
trade, it can be forgotten that other regions also face problems and political conflicts. Asia 
faces several territorial conflicts and many countries are concerned by the rise of China, 
Europe is currently unable to further build upon its achievements, but instead risks 
disintegration and North America has with the United States a superpower with an uncertain 
future. Thus, Brazil as well as South America finds itself in an unstable world, which does not 
seem to run away in terms of growth and integration. This bears risks as well as chances, 
which are of highest interest to investigate. 
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12. Appendix 
12.1 Exports 
 
 
Source: World Bank Data (2012) 
 
 
Source: World Bank Data (2012) 
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12.2 Growth 
12.2.1 GDP Growth Rate, Quarterly 
 
Source: IBGE, via www.tradingeconomics.com (2012) 
 
12.2.2 GDP Growth Annual (%) 
 
Source: World Bank Data (2012) 
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12.3.3 GDP Per Capita (Current US$) 
 
Source: World Bank Data (2012) 
 
12.2.3 GNI Per Capita, PPP (Current International $) 
 
Source: World Bank Data (2012) 
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12.3 Brazil Interest Rate, SELIC, in percent 
 
Source: BCB via www.tradingeconomics.com (2012) 
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12.4 Quarterly National Accounts 
 
 
12.5 WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2012-13 (Brazil) 
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